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Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself:




The depository institutions' industry has been subjected to a considerable crisis
with respect to the continuing viability of the "savings associations" 2 sector of the
industry.3 Federal concern over this crisis recently resulted in the enactment of tht
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 4
Its very name identifies the essential elements that stand in balance in the federal
response to the crisis, and these elements are articulated in the explicit statutory
purposes of FIRREA. At the center of this response is an effort to effect the iecovery
of the savings associations sector, by "establish[ing] a new corporation, to b known
* 1 Copyright 1989 Michael P. Malloy. Portions of this Article are drawn from a forthcoming cumulative
supplement to M. MALLOY, THE CORPORA E LAw OF BANKs (2 vols. 1988), to be published by Little, Brown and Company.
** Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., Georgetown University (1973); J.D., University
of Pennsylvania (1976); Ph.D., Georgetown University (1983). The author wishes to thank the Fordham University
School of Law for its material support of the research leading to publication of this Article.
1. In this context, the term "depository institution" is used to refer to commercial banks, savings banks and savings
and loan associations (now known collectively as "savings associations"), and credit unions. The general meaning of the
term is discussed in 1 M. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAw OF BANKS 5-8 (1988) (refer also to 1989 Cum. Supp. No. 2).
See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(l)(A) (1988) (Federal Reserve Act; statutory definition of "depository institution"), Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 204(c)(1), 103 Stat. 183, 191 (1989)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)) [hereinafter FIRREA] (Federal Deposit Insurance Act; definition of "depository
institution"). All subsequent citations to the United States Code following a reference to FIRREA are referring to the section
as amended by the 1989 Act. Other Code citations referto the section as it existed prior to 1989. See also infra notes 143-45
and accompanying text (recent statutory amendments concerning use of the term "depository institution").
2. The term "'savings association" is now a statutory term of art, defined as follows:
The term "savings association" means - (A) any Federal savings association; (B) any State savings associ-
ation; and (C) any corporation (other than a bank) that the Board of Directors [of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation] and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision jointly determine to be operating in substan-
tially the same manner as a savings association.
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(1)). For a discussion on the Director of the Office
of Thrift Supervision, see infra text accompanying notes 158-80. A "Federal savings association" is defined by FIRREA
to mean "any Federal savings association or Federal savings bank which is chartered under section 5 of the Home Owners'
Loan Act [codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464]." FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(b)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(2)). A
"State savings association" is defined to mean
(A) any building and loan association, savings and loan association, or homestead association; or
(B) any cooperative bank (other than a cooperative bank which is a State bank as defined in [FIRREA, supra
note 1, § 204(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2))]),
which is organized and operating according to the laws of the State ... in which it is chartered or organized.
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(b)(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3)). While this generic term of art "savings
association" is new to federal law, it has seen previous acceptance in state statutory provisions on the regulation of
depository institutions. See, e.g., CAL. FiN. CODE 88 5000-10050 (savings association law). See also I M. MALLOY, Supra
note 1, at 178:
The statutory trend, manifested in the California and Florida statutes, toward a unitary system regulating the
formation of any and all thrift institutions (generically referred to as associations or savings associations) seems
a particularly sensible one. In fact, the thrift institution industry is to a great extent unitary, and a reflection of
this unity in the regulatory system governing entry into the industry is quite appropriate.
(Emphasis in original)
3. See, e.g., infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the thrift industry crisis).
4. See supra note 1. See infra notes 119-285 and accompanying text (overview of FIRREA).
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as the Resolution Trust Corporation, [5] to contain, manage and resolve failed savings
associations" 6 and by "provid[ing] funds from public and private sources to deal
expeditiously with failed depository institutions." 7 In addition, the act is intended
"[t]o put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound financial footing.'' s
However, FIRREA is not simply a "bailout" of failing depository institutions.
It is evident from the structure of the act that "recovery" is counterbalanced by a
prospective concern with reform of the system of federal regulation of depository
institutions, and particularly of savings institutions, "[t]o promote, through regula-
tory reform, a safe and stable system of affordable housing finance. "9 Specific goals
of regulatory reform in this regard are articulated by FIRREA, in the following terms.
FIRREA is intended, among other things,
[t]o improve the supervision of savings associations by strengthening capital, accounting,
and other supervisory standards[;]['o]
* . . [t]o curtail investments and other activities of savings associations that pose unac-
ceptable risks to the Federal deposit insurance funds[;][ H]
... [tlo promote the independence of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [(FDIC)]
from the institutions the deposits of which it insures, by providing an independent board of
directors, adequate funding, and appropriate powers[;][12] [and]
... [tlo establish an Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department of the Treasury, under
the general oversight of the Secretary of the Treasury.' 3
A final theme in the federal response to the thrift crisis concerns enforcement,
a necessary aspect of any program aimed at the prospective reform of the depository
institutions industry and the system of regulation applicable to it. Here the express
statutory purposes are "[t]o strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators
of depository institutions"' 14 and "[t]o strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal
penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their
depositors." 15
This Article will focus upon the revision and reshaping of regulatory enforce-
ment powers and procedures. From this perspective, it should be noted that FIRREA
legislatively continues a process of revision that had already begun at the adminis-
5. For a discussion of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), see infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
6. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(7).
7. Id. § 101(8).
8. Id. § 101(5). On the realignment of the deposit insurance funds under FIRREA, see infra notes 148-52 and
accompanying text.
9. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(l).
10. Id. § 101(2). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 403-08 (1989) (discussing increased
capital standards for savings associations). See also infra notes 232-52 and accompanying text (discussion of capital and
other standards under FIRREA).
11. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(3). See H.R. CONF. RF'. No. 222, supra note 10, at 396-403 (discussing
changes in powers of savings associations). See also infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
12. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(4). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, supra note 10, at 393-403 (discussing the
enhanced role of the FDIC). See also infra notes 148-54, 176-87 and accompanying text.
13. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(6). See infra notes 158-80 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
Office of Thrift Supervision).
14. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(9). See H.R. CONF. RE. No. 222, supra note 10 at 439-48 (discussing
expanded regulatory enforcement authority). See also infra notes 286-338 and accompanying text.
15. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 101(10). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, supra note 10, at 445-47 (discussing
enhancement of civil and criminal penalties).
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trative level. There are distinct layers to this process which need to be identified
before we attempt an assessment of this federal regulatory enforcement process in
light of the provisions of FIRREA.
Accordingly, the analysis that follows will begin with a review of the recent,
pre-FIRREA revisions of regulations governing the procedures for administrative
enforcement actions.16 The Article will then offer a tour d'horizon of FIRREA, 17
intended to give a context to the more detailed treatment of FIRREA's enhancement
of the enforcement powers of the regulators. 18 The Article concludes with an assess-
ment of the likely impact of FIRREA on the enforcement process. 19
II. PRE-FIRREA REVISIONS OF FORMAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
A concerted effort at revising regulations concerning enforcement practices and
procedures had been under way for some time prior to congressional consideration of
FIRREA.20 Final revisions had already been promulgated by the FDIC in December
198821 and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in June 1989. 22 The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC or Comptroller) had issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking with respect to its corresponding regulations in May 1989.23
This section begins by identifying the scope of authority of the various federal
regulators of depository institutions with respect to formal enforcement practices and
procedures. 24 It then analyzes in some detail the recent efforts at administrative
revision of regulations concerning these enforcement practices and procedures. 25
A. Scope of Formal Enforcement Authority
There are five regulators of interest in the present context: (i) the OCC, char-
tering authority and principal federal regulator of national banks;2 6 (ii) the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), the U.S. central bank and
principal federal regulator of state-chartered, Fed-member banks and of bank holding
companies (BHCs);27 (iii) the FDIC, federal insurer of deposits of national and
16. See infra notes 20-118 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 119-285 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 286-343 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 344-85 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 14,247 (1985) (FDIC Regulation Review Program); 53 Fed. Reg. 5392 (1988)
(proposed FDIC revision of regulations); 53 Fed. Reg. 40,432 (1988) (proposed FHLBB revision of regulations).
21. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (1988) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 308) (revised FDIC Rules of Practice and Procedure
promulgated in final form).
22. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,349 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 509, 512) (revised FHLBB Rules of Practice and
Procedure promulgated in final form).
23. 54 Fed. Reg. 22,759 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 19) (proposed OCC revision of regulations).
24. See infra notes 26-76 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 77-118 and accompanying text.
26. On the role of the Comptroller and the OCC in bank regulation, see generally I M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at
28-40. National banks are commercial banks chartered by the Comptroller under the authority of the National Bank Act.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1988).
27. On the role of the Fed in bank regulation, see generally 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at 40-47. Fed-member
banks include all national banks in the continental United States, as required by law (see 12 U.S.C. §§ 221, 222 (1988)),
and those state-chartered banks and trust companies which have chosen to apply for, and have received, membership. See
id. § 321.
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state-chartered banks and, post-FIRREA, 28 of deposits of savings associations, 29 and
principal federal regulator of state-chartered, federally insured banks that are not
members of the Fed;30 (iv) the FHLBB and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), the pre-FIRREA3 1 primary federal regulator and insurer of
federally and state-chartered, FSLIC-insured savings associations and primary federal
regulator of savings and loan holding companies (SLHCs), now replaced by the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (DOTS) and the FDIC;32 and (v) the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), 33 chartering authority and regulator
of federal credit unions and principal federal regulator of state-chartered, federally
insured credit unions. The principal formal enforcement authorities that have been
exercised by these regulators are as follows. 34
1. Cease and Desist Orders
The cease and desist order is the administrative equivalent of an injunction. With
respect to orders to be issued against national banks and officials thereof, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA)35 granted this power to the Comptroller. 36 With re-
spect to state-chartered, Fed-member banks and with respect to BHCs, and the
officials of either, the FDIA granted the power to the Fed.37 Finally, the FDIA
granted this power to the FDIC, with respect to state-chartered, nonmember insured
banks and officials thereof. 38
The FHLBB and the FSLIC exercised parallel statutory authority, pre-FIRREA,
as to federally chartered thrift associations and as to state-chartered insured thrift
28. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (FDIC authority under FIRREA to insure deposits ofbanks and
savings associations).
29. On the meaning of the term "savings association," see supra note 2.
30. On the role of the FDIC in bank regulation, see generally 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at 47-52. On the
expanded role of the FDIC as a federal bank regulator, post-FIRREA, see infra notes 148-54, 176-87 and accompanying
text.
31. The FHLBB and FSLIC have been abolished by FIRREA (see infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text), and
their regulatory and insurance functions redistributed in the federal bank regulatory system. See infra notes 150, 158-87
and accompanying text. However, FIRREA makes provision for the continuation of regulations and other administrative
actions of these predecessor agencies (see infra notes 155-56), and so the recently revised practice and procedure
regulations of the FHLBB remain pertinent to the present inquiry.
32. On the previous role of the FHLBB and the FSLIC as thrift regulators, see I M. MALoY, supra note 1, at
52-60. Their regulatory and supervisory functions are now performed principally by the DOTS. See infra notes 158-80
and accompanying text (discussion of authority of DOTS under FIRREA). The FSLIC deposit insurance function is now
performed by the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) within the FDIC. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying
text.
33. On the role of the NCUA as federal regulator of credit unions, see 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at 60-65.
34. For a more detailed treatment of the background and provisions of statutory authority underlying these formal
enforcement authorities, pre-FIRREA, see Malloy, Balancing Public Confidence and Confidentiality: Adjudication Prac-
tices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 61 TEsip. L. REv. 723, 733-48 (1988).
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988). The FDIA has since been substantially amended by FIRREA, supra note 1,
§§ 201-226.
36. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(1), 1818(b)(1) (1988) (Comptroller "appropriate Federal banking agency" for cease
and desist orders against national banks and officials thereof).
37. See id. §§ 1813(q)(2)(A)-(E), 1818(b)(1), (3) (Fed "appropriate Federal banking agency" for cease and desist
orders against, inter alia, state-chartered, Fed-member banks, and to BHCs and nonbanking subsidiaries of BHCs).
38. See id. §§ 1813(q)(3), 1818(b)(1) (FDIC "appropriate Federal banking agency" for cease and desist orders
against state-chartered nonmember insured banks).
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institutions and SLHCs, respectively. 39 FIRREA transferred this authority to the
DOTS under the FDIA. 4°
The Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA)4 1 granted authority, substantially similar
to that of the bank regulators, for the issuance of cease and desist orders as to
federally chartered and federally insured credit unions to the NCUA Board and
officials thereof.42
2. Temporary Cease and Desist Orders
The Comptroller, the Fed, the FDIC, the NCUA, and-pre-FIRREA-the
FHLBB and the FSLIC had each been granted authority as to depository institutions
under their respective jurisdictions, to issue temporary cease and desist orders. 43 As
to depository institutions formerly under the supervision of the FHLBB and the
FSLIC, FIRREA has transferred this authority to the DOTS. 44 The temporary cease
and desist power has been available to deal with exigencies such as violations or
threatened violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices that are "likely to cause
insolvency or substantial dissipation of assets or earnings" of a depository institution
or are "likely to seriously weaken [its] condition ... or otherwise seriously prejudice
the interests of its depositors" during the pendency of a cease and desist
proceeding. 45
3. Suspension and Removal
Under specified conditions, the FDIA granted correlative power to the Comp-
troller and the Fed to remove a director, officer, or person participating in the conduct
of the affairs (management participant) of a national bank,46 with the Comptroller
initiating the removal proceedings and the Fed exclusively determining whether a
removal order should issue. 47 The Fed also exercises removal authority with respect
to directors, officers, and management participants of state-chartered Fed-member
banks48 and of BHCs. 49 The FDIC exercises removal authority with respect to di-
rectors, officers, and management participants of state-chartered, nonmember insured
banks.50 In addition, each of these regulators had been granted the power to suspend
directors and officers and to prohibit participation by management participants, pend-
ing the completion of removal proceedings.51
39. See Malloy, supra note 34, at 731 (discussing FHLBB and FSLIC cease and desist authority).
40. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
41. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-95 (1988).
42. See id. § 1786(e)(1).
43. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(3) (FHLBB authority), 1730(f) (FSLIC), 1786(f) (NCUA), 1813(q), 1818(c)(1)
(1988) (temporary cease and desist authority for "appropriate Federal bank agencies").
44. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (1988).
46. Id. § 1818(e)(1)-(2).
47. Id. § 1818(e)(4).
48. Id. §§ 1813(q)(2), 1818(e)(l)-(2).
49. See id. § 1818(b)(3) (removal provision applicable to BHCs and nonbanking subsidiaries thereof).
50. Id. §§ 1813(q)(3), 1818(e)(1)-(2).
51. Id. § 1818(e)(3).
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Pre-FIRREA, the FHLBB and the FSLIC had exercised suspension and removal
authority as to federally chartered thrift associations and as to state-chartered, insured
thrift institutions and SLHCs, respectively.5 2 FIRREA has transferred this authority
to the DOTS. 53
Substantially similar suspension and removal power is exercised by the NCUA
as to directors, committee members, officers, and management participants of fed-
erally chartered or insured credit unions.5 4
4. Summary Suspension and Removal
In situations in which a director, officer, or management participant of any
insured depository institution is charged with a felony involving dishonesty or breach
of trust, a relatively summary procedure exists for the suspension and removal, under
specified circumstances, of such a person by, depending upon the type of institution,
the Comptroller, 55 the Fed, 56 the FDIC, 57 the NCUA,58 and-pre-FIRREA-the
FHLBB and the FSLIC. 59 Post-FIRREA, the summary suspension and removal au-
thority of these last two agencies is to be exercised by the DOTS. 60
5. Civil Money Penalties
Authority to assess civil money penalties, under specified circumstances, is
granted under the FDIA to the Comptroller, with respect to national banks and
directors, officers, employees, agents, and management participants thereof;61 to the
Fed, with respect to state-chartered, Fed-member banks and officials thereof62 and
with respect to BHCs and officials thereof;63 and to the FDIC, with respect to state-
chartered, nonmember insured banks.6 a
Pre-FIRREA, the FHLBB and the FSLIC had authority to impose civil money
penalties as to federally chartered thrift associations and officials thereof and as to
52. See Malloy, supra note 34, at 732 (discussing FHLBB and FSLIC suspension and removal authority).
53. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g) (1988).
55. Id. §§ 1813(q)(1), 1818(g) (Comptroller "appropriate Federal banking agency" for summary suspension and
removal proceedings against officials of national banks).
56. Id. §§ 1813(q)(2), 1818(g) (Fed "appropriate Federal banking agency" for summary suspension and removal
proceedings against officials of state-chartered, Fed-member banks).
57. Id. §§ 1813(q)(3), 1818(g) (FDIC "appropriate Federal banking agency" for summary suspension and removal
proceedings against officials of state-chartered, nonmember insured banks).
58. Id. § 1786(i) (NCUA summary suspension and removal authority with respect to officials of federally chartered
or insured credit unions).
59. See id. §§ 1464(d)(5), 1730(h) (pre-FIRREA authority of FHLBB and FSLIC to exercise summary suspension
and removal power as to officials of federally chartered thrift associations and as to federally insured institutions and
SLHCs, respectively).
60. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
61. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(1), 1818(i)(2) (1988) (Comptroller "appropriate Federal banking agency" for imposi-
tion of civil money penalties against national banks and officials thereof).
62. Id. 55 1813(q)(2), 1818(i)(2) (Fed "appropriate Federal banking agency" for imposition of civil money
penalties against state-chartered, Fed-member banks and officials thereof).
63. See id. § 1818(b)(3) (civil money penalties provision applicable to BHCs and nonbanking subsidiaries thereof).
64. Id. 55 1813(q)(3), 1818(i)(2) (FDIC "appropriate Federal banking agency" for imposition of civil money
penalties against state-chartered, nonmember insured banks and officials thereof).
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state-chartered, insured thrift institutions and SLHCs and officials thereof,
respectively. 65 FIRREA has transferred this authority to the DOTS.
66
Substantially similar civil money penalties authority is exercised by the NCUA
under the FCUA as to federally chartered or insured credit unions and officials
thereof. 67
6. Other Enforcement Powers
For present purposes, we shall focus on regulations implementing the formal
enforcement powers identified above. There are, however, a broader range of en-
forcement authorities available to the federal regulators of depository institutions.68
Among the more formidable enforcement powers are such authorities as charter
revocation 69 and deposit insurance termination. 7
0
Other, more specialized enforcement powers available to these federal regulators
include, inter alia, (i) civil money penalties provisions for violations of specified
provisions of the Federal Reserve Act;7 1 (ii) criminal and civil penalty provisions for
violations of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA);72 (iii) civil money penalties
provisions for violations of the anti-tying provisions of the BHCA amendments of
1970;73 (iv) enforcement authority under the Depository Institutions Management
Interlocks Act (DIMIA),74 which intersects the authority granted under the FDIA and
the NCUA;75 (v) authority under section 12(i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) 76 with respect to the securities of depository institutions registered under
that act.
B. Recent Pre-FIRREA Revisions of Formal Enforcement Regulations
For the sake of convenience, the discussion that follows will focus upon the
FDIC revisions of formal enforcement practice and procedures. 77 As appropriate,
corresponding provisions of the recently revised FHLBB regulations and the pro-
posed OCC revisions will be noted in the context of the provisions of the FDIC
revision. 78
65. See Malloy, supra note 34, at 733 (discussing FHLBB and FSLIC civil money penalties authority).
66. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 1786(k)(2) (1988).
68. See generally Huber, Enforcement Powers of the Federal Banking Agencies, 7 ANN. REv. B KING L. 123
(1987) (exhaustive discussion of range of state and federal criminal and formal and informal civil enforcement author-
ities).
69. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 93 (national bank charters), 1766 (1988) (federal credit union charters).
70. See id. § 1818(a).
71. Id. §§ 504, 505.
72. Id. § 1847.
73. See id. § 1972(2)(F).
74. Id. §§ 3201-3208. See generally 1 M. MAtoy, supra note 1, at 244-45.
75. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(3) (violations of DIMIA subject to suspension and removal authority of
FDIA), 1786(g)(3) (1988) (same; suspension and removal authority of FCUA).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982). See generally 1 M. M.A.oy, supra note I, at 491-93. See also infra notes 253-56
and accompanying text (discussion of technical amendments to 1934 Act under FIRREA).
77. See infra Illustration 1 (comparing provisions of prior and revised FDIC rules of practice and procedure).
78. See infra Illustration 2 (contrasting corresponding provisions of formal enforcement regulations of the federal
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On December 22, 1988, the FDIC published in final form a revision of its rules
of practice and procedures. 79 Among other things, the revision had the effect, in
certain respects, of substantially revising the rules applicable to formal enforcement
proceedings with respect to cease and desist orders, temporary cease and desist
orders, suspensions and removals, and civil money penalties. 80 The revised rules are
applicable to any proceeding instituted after January 1, 1989.81
Proceedings commence under the revised regulations with the issuance of a
notice. 82 The notice must set forth the basis for FDIC jurisdiction in the proceeding,
the claim showing that the FDIC is entitled to relief, and a prayer for relief. 83 The
notice must also advise the respondent 84 that an answer85 must be filed within twenty
days after service of the notice, 86 and that a hearing on the notice will be held within
a specified judicial district 87 at a specified time. 88 Furthermore, in FDIA civil money
regulators). In fact, parallels between the FDIC revisions, promulgated in December 1988, and the FHLBB revisions,
promulgated in June 1989, were quite conscious. See 54 Fed. Reg. 26,350 (1989):
The [FHLBB] notes that the [FDIC], which has similar enforcement authority with respect to federally insured
banks, recently adopted extensive revisions to its own rules of practice and procedure.... The [FHLBB]'s staff
has been in contact with the FDIC staff about our common interests in revising and updating the hearing
procedures for both agencies. Many of the revisions being adopted by the [FHLBB] today closely resemble the
rules adopted by the FDIC.
See also 54 Fed. Reg. 26,350-51 (1989) (FHLBB discussion of comments incorporating comments received by FDIC on
its proposed revision).
79. 53 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (1988) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 308).
80. See 53 Fed. Reg. 51,659-66 (1988) (agency discussion of changes in generally applicable rules of practice);
id. at 51,667 (discussion of clarifying amendments to rules and procedures applicable to cease and desist proceedings);
id. (discussion of clarifying amendments to rules and procedures applicable to suspensions and removals); id. (discussion
of changes in rules and procedures applicable to civil money penalties proceedings); id. at 51,668 (discussion of changes
in rules and procedures applicable to summary suspensions and removals).
81. 12 C.F.R. § 308.03(a)(1) (1989). For pre-revision proceedings, the revised rules may be applied if the parties,
with the consent of the administrative law judge (AU), agree. Id. § 308.03(a)(2). The FHLBB revised rules are applicable
to all formal enforcement proceedings in which the notice initiating the proceeding is issued after June 23, 1989, the
publication date of the FHLBB revisions in final form. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 26,350 (1989).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 308.20(a) (1989). For these purposes, "notice" is defined as "the entire document issued by the
[FDIC] Board of Directors or its designee which is served upon a party and which initiates a proceeding conducted under
[12 C.F.R. pt. 308]." Id. § 308.010). For the generally applicable rules with respect to service of papers, see id. §
308.13. On the grounds for issuance of a notice in a cease and desist proceeding, see id. § 308.65. On the grounds for
issuance of a notice in a removal proceeding, see id. § 308.70.
On the notice in FHLBB proceedings, see id. § 509.13. On service of papers, see id. § 509.9.
On the notice in the OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed. Reg. 22,769 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 19. 10(a)). On service of papers, see 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,770 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.1 l(c),(d)).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 308.20(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (1989). A proposed order may be served instead of, or as a supplement to,
the prayer for relief. Id. § 308.20(b)(1)(iii).
84. The "Respondent" is defined as "any person against whom the FDIC seeks relief in the Notice." Id.
§ 308.01(n).
85. For the generally applicable procedural rules with respect to the answer, see id. § 308.21. For the correspond-
ing provisions under the FHLBB rules, see id. § 509.14. For the corresponding provisions of the OCC proposed revision,
see 54 Fed. Reg. 22,769 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.10(b)-(d)).
86. On time limits generally, see 12 C.F.R. § 308.14 (1989). For extension of time for filing the notice, for good
cause shown, see id. § 308.21(a)(2). See also id. § 308.15 (generally applicable rules with respect to extensions of time
limits).
87. See id. § 308.20(b)(2)(iv).
88. In cease and desist proceedings or removal proceedings (including proceedings to prohibit further participation
by a management participant), the hearing must commence within 60 days after service of the notice. Id.
§ 308.20(b)(2)(v)(A). In all other proceedings, the hearing must commence within 120 days. Id. § 308.20(b)(2)(v)(B).
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penalty proceedings, the notice must advise the respondent that a request for a hearing
must be filed 89 within ten days after service of the notice. 90
A notice or answer may be amended or supplemented, upon good cause shown,
by leave of the administrative law judge (ALJ)91 appointed by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), at the FDIC Executive Secretary's instance, 92 after receipt of
the answer in the proceeding. 93
Discovery is limited to documentary discovery. 94 Privileged material is not
discoverable, 95 but all other relevant documents, whether or not admissible at
hearing, 96 are generally discoverable. 97
At the conclusion of a hearing, 98 each party99 is required to file with the ALJ
proposed findings of facts, proposed conclusions of law, a proposed order,' o and
may in addition file a post-hearing brief.1o1 All such post-hearing filings must be
made within thirty days after the hearing transcript is delivered to all parties or filed,
whichever is earlier.'0 2 Any party that files proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law and a post-hearing brief is permitted to file a reply brief within fifteen days
89. For generally applicable rules with respect to filings, see id. § 308.12. On the corresponding provisions under
the FHLBB rules, see id. § 509.10. For the corresponding provisions of the OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed. Reg.
22,769 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.11(a),(b)).
90. 12 C.F.R. § 308.20(b)(2)(iii) (1989). On the corresponding provisions under the FHLBB rules, see id.
§ 509.34. For the corresponding provisions of the OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed. Reg. 22,776 (1989) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 19.81).
91. 12 C.F.R. § 308.22(a) (1989). On the powers of the ALJ generally, see id. § 308.07.
92. On the authority of the Executive Secretary with respect to formal enforcement proceedings, see id.
§ 308.05(b).
93. Id. § 308.06(b)(1). This practice of obtaining AI~s from other agencies, through the OPM, is the standard
practice among all the federal regulators of depository institutions. See Malloy, supra note 34, at 728, 795. This practice
is inconsistent with explicit provisions of federal administrative law. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). The practice has been
the subject of recent criticism (see infra notes 357-60 and accompanying text) and its discontinuance has been mandated
by FIRREA. See infra note 363 and accompanying text. The corresponding provisions of the FHLBB rules are equally
deficient. See 12 C.F.R. § 509.3(a) (1989). The OCC proposed revision does not address the issue.
94. 12 C.F.R. § 308.25(a) (1989). But cf. id. § 308.29 (permitting depositions of witnesses unavailable for
hearing). On the time limits applicable to discovery, see id. § 308.26. On discovery rules, see id. §§ 308.27 (document
discovery from parties), 308.28 (non-parties). These rules are relatively more extensive than the discovery rules under the
prior FDIC practice and procedure rules. See Malloy, supra note 34, at 763 (FDIC rules "characteristically thin on such
matters as rules of evidence and discovery"). On the corresponding provisions under the FHLBB rules, see 12 C.F.R.
§ 509.21 (1989). For the corresponding provisions of the OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed. Reg. 22,772 (1989) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.33).
95. 12 C.F.R. § 308.25(c) (1989).
96. On rules of evidence under the revised rules, see id. § 308.38.
97. See id. § 308.25(b): "It is not a ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
hearing if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
98. For rules concerning practice and procedures with respect to hearings, see id. §§ 308.32 (scheduling of
hearing), 308.34 (general rules with respect to time for commencement of hearing, effect of failure to appear), 308.35
(hearing subpoenas), 308.36 (conduct of hearings). See also id. §§ 308.33 (prehearing submissions and conferences),
308.37 (written testimony in lieu of oral hearing).
99. For purposes of these rules, the term "party" is defined to mean "a person named or admitted as a party for
some or all purposes." Id. § 308.01(l). Cf. id. §§ 308.23(b) (intervention; persons with "official interest" in the
substance of proceedings), 308.24 (consolidation and severence of actions "for some or all purposes").
100. Id. § 308.39(a)(1)-(3). On the corresponding provisions under the FHLBB rules, see 54 Fed. Reg. 26,359
(1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 509.27(a)). For the corresponding provisions of the OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed.
Reg. 22,774 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.50).
101. 12 C.F.R. § 308.39(a) (1989). See 54 Fed. Reg. 26,359 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 509.27(a)) (corre-
sponding FHLBB provision). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 22,774 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.50) (corresponding
OCC proposed provision).
102. 12 C.F.R. § 308.39(a) (1989).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
after the end of that thirty-day period. 10 3 Reply briefs are limited to responses to new
matters, issues, and arguments raised in another party's papers. t0 4
Within fifty days after the end of that thirty-day period, the AD is required to
file with the FDIC Executive Secretary the record of the proceeding, including, inter
alia, the AL's recommended decision, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
proposed order. 105 At the same time, the ALJ is required to serve upon each party a
copy of the recommended decision, findings, conclusions, and proposed order.'0 6
Within twenty days of such service upon the parties, exceptions to the recommended
decision may be filed by any party with the Executive Secretary. 107 After the expi-
ration of the time for filing exceptions, the Executive Secretary submits the official
record'0 8 of the action to the FDIC Board and notifies the party of this submission. I09
Generally within ninety days of submission," 0 the Board is required to issue its
decision. I "
These general rules are applicable to cease and desist proceedings, but not to the
issuance of a temporary cease and desist order. 12 Similarly, the general rules are
applicable to removal proceedings, but not to the issuance of a temporary suspension
order. 113 Summary suspension and removal proceedings are governed by a separate
set of rules and procedures. 14
The general rules also apply to FDIA civil money penalty proceedings. 115 How-
103. Id. § 308.39(b).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 308.40(a)(1). On the corresponding provisions under the FHLBB rules, see 54 Fed. Reg. 26,359 (1989)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 509.27(b)). The corresponding provision in the OCC revision would generally give 45 days for
the filing of the recommended decision of the "presiding officer" (see 54 Fed. Reg. 22,774 (1989) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 19.52(a))) and would allow the recommended decision to become the final decision of the Comptroller 30 days
after receipt thereof, with certain specified exceptions. See 54 Fed. Reg. 22,775 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 19.52(b)).
106. 12 C.F.R. § 308.40(a)(2) (1989).
107. Id. § 308.41(a)(1). On the corresponding provisions under the FHLBB rules, see 54 Fed. Reg. 26,368 (1989)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 509.29(a)). The OCC proposed revision provides for an administrative appeal process and review
by the Comptroller of the recommended decision. See 54 Fed. Reg. 22,775 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 19.60-19.61).
108. On the maintenance of the official record, see 12 C.F.R. § 308.11 (1989).
109. Id. § 308.42. On the corresponding provisions under the FHLBB rules, see 54 Fed. Reg. 26,369 (1989)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 509.31). For the corresponding provisions of the OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed. Reg.
22,775 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.62).
110. Where the FDIC Board grants a written request for post-hearing oral argument before the Board, per 12 C.F.R.
§ 308.43 (1989), the decision is required within 90 days after submission, or 30 days after oral argument, whichever is
later. Id. § 308.44(a).
111. Id. § 308.44(a). However, the Board may in the interim set aside the notice of submission and remand the case
or any aspect thereof to the ALJ for further proceedings. See id. § 308.44(b). On the corresponding provisions under the
FHLBB rules, see 54 Fed. Reg. 26,369 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 509.32). For the corresponding provisions of the
OCC proposed revision, see 54 Fed. Reg. 22,775 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.63).
112. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 308.64(a), 308.68(c) (1989). For procedures governing issuance of temporary cease and
desist orders, see id. § 308.68.
113. See id. 99 308.69, 308.73(c). For procedures governing issuance of temporary suspension orders, see id.
§ 308.73.
114. See id. 99 308.104-308.107.
115. See id. § 308.74(a)(1). Unlike the FDIC revised rules, the FHLBB revised rules for the most part do not break
out separate subparts detailing roles of practice and procedure specifically applicable to different types of formal en-
forcement actions, in addition to the generally applicable rules. See id. § 509.1 (general statement of scope of FI-ILBB
revised rules). But see 54 Fed. Reg. 26,369 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 99 509.33-509.38) (specific FHLBB revised
rules for civil money penalty proceedings). See also 12 C.F.R. pt. 509a (1989) (unrevised FHLBB rules governing
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ever, civil penalties are assessed upon service of the notice commencing the
proceedings. "t6 The hearing procedures of the general rules are not triggerred unless
the respondent affirmatively requests a hearing. "17 Furthermore, the notice of assess-
ment automatically becomes final and unappealable unless the respondent affirma-
tively requests a hearing and answers the notice in accordance with the general
rules.I 8
H. SELECTlVE OVERVIEW OF FIRREA
Dramatic proposals for thorough realignment of the regulatory system" 19 have
tended to be overshadowed by the need for solutions to other, more immediate crises
facing depository institutions. Such has been the case recently, as losses in the
savings associations industry reached record heights. ' 20
In early February 1989 the President announced a program intended to ensure
that the many financially troubled thrift institutions were dealt with promptly, with
due regard for the safety of insured depositors of such institutions.'12 Under the
program, a large number of such institutions were placed under the jurisdiction and
oversight of a joint team of regulatory agencies headed by the FDIC. 122 The joint
team consisted of the FDIC, the FHLBB, the FSLIC, the OCC, and the Fed.' 2 3 The
immediate objectives of the program were to establish control and oversight of each
troubled institution; to promote confidence and maintain customer services; to eval-
uate each such institution's condition and identify and account for all losses; to ensure
the safe and sound operation of the institutions; and to recommend the most viable
alternatives for the cost-effective resolution of each institution's case. 124 Taking hold
of the program, the FDIC shortly announced its intention to dispose of real estate
assets turned over to it as it "resolved" insolvencies in the thrift industry, neither
holding such assets in anticipation of future appreciation, nor "dumping" the assets
on the market below current value. l2
Clearly the most significant development in this context-and possibly in this
decade-was the plan to restructure the regulation of savings associations, also
summary suspension and removal proceedings). The OCC proposed revision goes to the other extreme, sprinkling the
corresponding rules over a multitude of subparts, beyond the sensible and orderly arrangement made by the FDIC rules.
See 54 Fed. Reg. 22,765-766 (1989) (cross reference chart comparing existing OCC provisions and proposed revisions;
general procedural rules contained in not one, but six subparts).
116. 12 C.F.R. § 308.75(a) (1989).
117. See id. §§ 308.20(b)(2)(ii), 308.75(a)(1).
118. See id. § 308.75(a)(1)-(2).
119. Cf. I M. MALLoY, supra note 1, at 76-77, discussing recommendations for reform of federal regulation of
financial services presented by Report of the Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services (1984).
120. See, e.g., Nash, Savings Loss Put at $2.3 Billion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at D I, col. 6 (reporting 1988
fourth-quarter deficit in savings industry that brought 1988 total to record $12.1 billion deficit). Deposit withdrawals at
thrifts were also setting record highs. See Nash, Savings and Loan Withdrawals In December a Record $8.1 Billion, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1989, at l, col. 4.
121. See FDIC Release PR-41-89, Feb. 24, 1989, reprinted in [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 87,600 (Mar. 3, 1989).
122. Id. at 94,644.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 94,644-94,645.
125. FDIC Release PR-44-89, Mar. 1, 1989, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,605 (Mar. 17, 1989).
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Illustration 1








General definitions 308.01 308.01
Rules of construction 308.02 308.02*
Transition rules $ 308.03
Rules of Practice
Scope 308.03 308.04*
Authority of Board and Executive Secretary 308.05
Appointment of administrative law judges 308.07(a) 308.06*
Powers of administrative law judges 308.07(b) 308.07
308.08(b)(9)
Appearance and practice before the FDIC 308.04 308.08*
308.47*
308.50*
Short and plain statement required 303.09
Good faith certification $ 308.10
Maintenance of the record - 308.11
Filing and service of papers 308.19(a) 308.12
308.21 303.13
308.22(b)
Time limits 308.22 308.14*
308.15*
Witness fees and expenses 308.10 308.16*
Unilateral settlement offers to the Board 308.07() 308.17*
Confidentiality 308.20 308.18*
FDIC's right to conduct examinations is unaffected 308.19
The notice 308.05 308.20*
The answer 308.06 308.21*
Amending pleadings t 308.22
Intervention; persons having official interest 308.07(f 308.23*
Consolidation and severance of actions * 308.24
Scope of discovery : 308.25
Time limits for discovery * 308.26
Document discovery from parties 308.08 308.27
Document subpoenas to nonparties 308.08 308.28
Depositions of witnesses unavailable for hearing 308.08(a)(2) 308.29*
308.09
Motions 308.12 308.30
Interlocutory appeals to the Board * 308.31
General procedures : 308.32
Preheating submissions and conferences 308.07(e) 308.33*
Hearings t 308.34
Hearing subpoenas 308.08 308.35
Conduct of hearings 308.07 308.36*
Written testimony in lieu of oral hearing : 308.37
Evidence 308.11 308.38*
Post-hearing papers 308.13(a)t 308.39t
Recommended decision and filing of record 308.13(b) 308.40*
Exceptions to recommended decision 308.14 308.41
308.15
(continued)
1989] ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL BANKING REGULATIONS 1129
Illustration 1 (continued)




All references are to 12 C.F.R.
Prior Revised
Provision (1988) (1989)
Notice of submission to the Board 308.16t 308.42t
Post-hearing oral argument before the Board 308.17t 308.43t
Decision by the Board 308.18 308.44*
Stays pending appeal 308.36(b) 308.45
308.43
Collateral attacks on administrative proceedings * 308.46
Conflicts of interest $ 308.47
Ex parte communications 308.07(c) 308.48
Sanctions t 308.49
Suspension and disbarment 308.04(b) 308.50*
Cease and Desist Proceedings
Scope 308.321 308.64t
Grounds for cease and desist orders 308.33t 308.65t
308.38t
Notice to state supervisory authority 308.34t 308.66t
Notice of charges and of hearing, and consent 308.35 t
Effective date of order and service on bank 308.36(b) 308.67
Temporary cease and desist order 308.37 308.68
Suspension and Removal
Scope 308.39 308.69
Grounds for removal or prohibition 308.401 308.70t
Notice to state supervisory authority 308.41t 308.71t
Notice of intention to remove, hearing and consent 308.42 t
Effective date of removal or prohibition order 308.43t 308.72t
Grounds for suspension or prohibition 308.44t' 308.73(a)(I )t
Temporary suspension order 308.45t 308.73(a)(2)t
308.73(b)t
Extraterritorial acts of officals of foreign banks 308.46 :
Civil Money Penalties
Scope 308.64t 308.74t
Violation of order or directive as grounds for assessment 308.65 :
Violation of laws limiting dealings with bank officials and affiliates as
ground for assessment 308.66
Violation of law governing correspondent accounts as ground for
assessment 308.67
Relevant considerations 308.68t 308.75(b)t
Assessment of penalties [308.69] 308.75
Waiver of hearing 308.70t 308.75(a)t
Effective date of, and payment under, an order to pay 308.72 308.76
Summary Suspension and Removal
Scope 308.55(a),(b)t 308.104t
Relevant considerations 308.56(a)t 308.105t






Reconsideration by the Board of Directors 308.63
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Illustration 2
Comparison of Agency Regulations
*Covered by "General Provisions"
tCovered by "Rules of Practice"
No corresponding provision













Appointment of administrative law
judges
Powers of administrative law
judges
Appearance before the agency
Short and plain statement
required
Good faith certification
Maintenence of the record
Filing of papers
Service of papers
Formal requirements as to papers
filed
Construction of time limits
Time limits
Witness fees and expenses
Unilateral settlement offers to the
Board
Confidentiality







Consolidation and severance of
actions
Scope of discovery
Time limits for discovery
Document discovery from parties
Subpoenas





















308.06 509.3 19.1(k) 263.6(a)
308.07 509.4 19.41 263.6(b)
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Illustration 2 (continued)
Comparison of Agency Regulations
*Covered by "General Provisions"
tCovered by "Rules of Practice"
:No corresponding provision




































Notice of submission to the regulator 308.42 509.31
Post-hearing oral argument before
the regulator 308.43 509.30
Decision by the regulator 308.44 509.32
Stays pending appeal 308.45 :
Collateral attacks on administrative
proceedings 308.46 *
Conflicts of interest 308.47 509.5(b
Ex pare communications 308.48 509.7
Sanctions
Suspension and disbarment
Cease and Desist Proceedings
Scope
Grounds for cease and desist orders
Notice to state supervisory authority
Notice of charges and of hearing,
and consent
Effective date of order and service
on bank
Temporary cease and desist order
Suspension and Removal
Scope
Grounds for removal or prohibition
Notice to state supervisory authority
Notice of intention to remove,
hearing and consent
Effective date of removal or
prohibition order
Temporary suspension order
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Illustration 2 (continued)
Comparison of Agency Regulations
*Covered by "General Provisions"
tCovered by "Rules of Practice"
:No corresponding provision





Effective date of, and payment
under, an order to pay





Notice of suspension, and orders of
removal or prohibition
Effectiveness of suspension or







Proposed findings and conclusions
and recommended decisions
Decision of the agency
Miscellaneous provision




























































aThe revised FHLBB rules can also be found beginning at 54 Fed. Reg. 26,359 (1989). The proposed OCC rules can
be found beginning at 54 Fed. Reg. 22,759 (1989).
bin October 1989 the NCUA promulgated in final form substantial revisions of its regulations governing adminis-
trative actions, adjudicative hearings and rules of practice and procedure. 54 Fed. Reg. 43,280 (1989) (codified at 12
C.F.R. §§ 747.01, 747.101, 747.122, 747.301-747.306, 747.401-747.409, 747.501-747.507, 747.601-747.611). The
revision was intended to conform these regulations to certain changes and clarifications mandated by FIRREA. See id. at
43,281 (discussing background of the revision). In addition, the NCUA published for comment a proposed rulemaking
intended to clarify NCUA authority to conduct formal and informal investigations. 54 Fed. Reg. 43,299 (1989) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 747.1001-747.1003, 747.1101-747.1107). These proposed amendments also relate to clarifi-
cations of NCUA authority under FIRREA. See id. at 43,299.
'12 C.F.R. pt. 509a, concerning summary suspension and removal, was not included in the June 1989 revision by
the FHLBB.
announced by President Bush in early February 1989.t26 Immediately upon the an-
nouncement of the proposal, the FSLIC and the FDIC initiated joint supervisory
efforts with respect to resolution of specific thrift institution problems, with the FDIC
126. See President's Plan to Restructure Regulation of Thrifts, Am. Banker, Feb. 8, 1989, at 4, col. I (re-
producing the text of fact sheet, released February 6, 1989, that detailed the President's reform proposal). See also Dowd,
Bush Savings Plan Calls for Sharing the Cost Broadly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Murray & Thomas,
Dinosaur Industry: Bush's New Solution For Problems of S&Ls Could Kill Them Off, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at Al,
col. 6.
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assuming supervisory control over insolvent thrifts. 27 It was estimated at the time
that some 350 insolvent thrift institutions might eventually be involved. 128
While the proposal received a generally favorable initial reaction, 129 questions
were almost immediately raised concerning the cost 130 and sufficiency of the
proposal. 131 Nor was the proposal popular with the thrift industry itself. 132
By mid-February 1989 the Bush Administration released a summary of legisla-
tion for an expanded proposal for resolution of the thrift crisis.133 The expanded
proposal made clear the enhanced role of the FDIC in the regulation of depository
institutions. 134 In addition, among other things, the expanded proposal contemplated
enhanced authority for the acquisition of thrift institutions by bank holding
companies, 35 and an elimination of "cross-marketing" restrictions that applied to
the marketing of bank-originated products through affiliated nonbank institutions. 136
The proposed FIRREA received relatively swift congressional consideration.
The proposed legislation was introduced in the Senate on February 22, 1989,137 and
was approved by the Senate, substantially as proposed, on April 19, 1989.138 The
proposed legislation was later approved in modified form by the House of
Representatives. 39 The final version of the FIRREA was approved by the Senate and
the House on August 4, 1989,140 and on August 9, 1989, the President signed H.R.
1278 into law. 14 1
127. See MeTague, FDIC Takes Control of 222 S&Ls, Am. Banker, Feb. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (FDIC in effect begins
administrative merger with FSLIC under the terms of a management contract between the two agencies); Nash, Bank
Regulators Assuming Control of4 Savings Units, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at A1, col. 1; Nash, Six Savings Institutions
Taken Over by the U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1989, at 36, col. 1.
128. Nash, U.S. Weighing Plan to Take Over 350 Insolvent Savings Institutions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1989, § 1,
at 1, col. 1.
129. See, e.g., Garsson, While Welcomed as a First Step, Plan Faces Big Changes, Am. Banker, Feb. 8, 1989, at
2, col. 1.
130. See, e.g., Nash, Savings Rescue to Cost Taxpayers An Extra $20 Billion, Data Show, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10,
1989, at Al, col. 4; Nash, Taxpayer Cost of Bailouts Put at $80 Billion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1989, at D, col. 3.
Whatever the cost, early reaction appeared to indicate that it was unlikely that the industry cost of the proposal would be
passed along to consumers, given the competitive nature of the market. See Celis, Banks, Thrifts Unlikely to Pass Along
Costs of Bailout, Some Executives Say, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1989, at A2, col. 2.
131. See, e.g., Duke & Thomas, Thrift Rescue Plan Is Subject of Doubts, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1989, at A2, col. 2
(reporting questions concerning whether the size and pace of the proposed plan was sufficient); Ringer, $50 Million to
Track Down Fraud Termed 'Window Dressing,' Am. Banker, Feb. 8, 1989, at 14, col. 1.
132. See, e.g., Rosenstein, Trade Groups Cite Difficuly of Meeting 6% Capital Standard, Am. Banker, Feb. 8,
1989, at 2, col. 1; MeTaguc, Bush S&L Plan Draws Heavy Fire, Am. Banker, Feb. 16, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
133. See Bush Plan to Solve the Savings and Loan Problem, Am. Banker, Feb. 16, 1989, at 4, col. 1 [hereinafter
"Proposal Summary"] (reproducing the text of detailed summary, released February 14, 1989, that outlined the Presi-
dent's expanded reform proposal).
134. See id. See also Garsson, Studies of Bush Plan Uncover A Vastly More Powerful FDIC, Am. Banker, Mar. 13,
1989, at 1, col. 2; Nash, Concern Grows on F.D.I.C. Power, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at DI, col. 3; Duke, 'Dual
Banking' Faces a Possibly Crippling Blow In Bush's Plan to Curb State Powers Over S&Ls, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1989,
at A24, col. 1.
135. See Proposal Summary, supra note 133, at 8.
136. See id.
137. See 135 CONo. REc. S1513 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1989) (introducing S.413).
138. 135 CoxG. REc. S4238 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (passage of S.774).
139. See 135 Co.NG. REc. H2602 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (substitution of H.R. 1278).
140. Id. at S10,214; 135 CoN. REc. H5315 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
141. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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The discussion that follows in this section summarizes some of the principal
features of the FIRREA. More detailed analysis of the provisions of the FIRREA
concerned with regulatory enforcement powers and procedures will be presented in
the next section.
A. Regulatory Realignment
The FIRREA works a number of very significant changes in the regulatory
environment, both directly and indirectly related to the stated "reform" purposes of
the legislation. 142 Some indication of the nature of the fundamental realignment of the
regulatory system underlying the legislation may be suggested by a shift in termi-
nology; the FDIA 143 will now generally refer to "insured depository institutions"144
rather than "insured banks." 145 Thus, federal regulation has taken a further step
towards realignment around a unifying, functional concept like "depository institu-
tion" as its basic frame of reference.
This realignment has certain concrete consequences for the structure of federal
regulation. (See Illustration 3, infra.) The Board of Directors of the FDIC has been
expanded to five members, three of whom are directly appointed by the President
with Senate advice and consent. 146 The remaining two members serve by virtue of
their offices, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of the newly created
Office of Thrift Supervision (DOTS). 147
The FDIC has been given responsibility for insurance of deposits of savings
associations. 4 8 It will now administer a Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), formerly the
Permanent Insurance Fund with respect to deposits of insured banks,149 and a Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), replacing the functions of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).t5 0 In addition, to wrap up the affairs of the
FSLIC, an FSLIC Resolution Fund has been established, to be managed and sepa-
rately maintained by the FDIC, consisting of assets and liabilities transferred from the
142. See, e.g., supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
143. FIRREA, supra note 1, §§ 201-226 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1833).
144. For purposes of the FDIA, the term "depository institution" is defined to mean any "bank or savings
association." FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)). On the general meaning of the term,
see supra note 1. On the new generic term "savings association," see supra note 2.
145. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 201(a)(1) (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See also FIRREA, supra note
1, § 207 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1816) (factors to be considered in insurance applications; reference to "depository
institution" rather than "bank"), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 209 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1819) (corporate powers of
FDIC; same), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 216(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1822) (FDIC as receiver, same).
146. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 203(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1)(C)).
147. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 203(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(I)(A)-(B)). On the DOTS, see infra notes
158-80 and accompanying text.
148. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 205(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a)). See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 402(c)
(procedure for differences in deposit insurance coverage between FDIC and abolished FSLIC). On the meaning of the term
"savings association," see supra note 2. The procedures for termination of FDIC deposit insurance have also been exten-
sively revised. See id. at § 926 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)).
149. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 21"1(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)-(5)). On the investment of funds held
in the BIF, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 217(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(a)).
150. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 211(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4), (6)). On the investment of funds held
in the SAIF, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 217(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (a)).
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Illustration 3
Regulatory Structural Changes Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act*
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*Structural aspects not affected by FIRREA are generally not included in this illustration.
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FSLIC.'51 The FSLIC Resolution Fund is to be dissolved upon the satisfaction of all
debts and liabilities and the sale of all assets.' 52
The FDIC's powers as conservator or receiver have also been expanded and
include appointment as receiver for any insured depository institution. 5 3 Likewise,
provisions concerning the use of FDIC funds with respect to insured banks which are
closed or are in danger of closing have been correspondingly amended to cover the
authority of the FDIC to respond to the problem of insured depository institutions in
default. 154
Certainly the most dramatic indications of structural realigment will be seen in
the immediate abolition of the FSLIC155 and, effective sixty days after the enactment
of FIRREA, the abolition of the FHLBB and the position of Chairman of the
FHLBB. 156 In addition, the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) has been completely
revised by FIRREA. '5 7 An Office of Thrift Supervision has been established within
the Treasury Department, 58 and the DOTS' 59 effectively replaces the FHLBB and
the Chairman of the FHLBB ,60 except to the extent that any powers of the FHLBB
or the Chairman have been transferred to other agencies. ' 6'
The DOTS is to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, for a term of five years. 16 2 The DOTS must be a U.S. citizen.163 Despite
the virtual collapse of the thrift industry during his tenure, the then current Chairman
of the FHLBB has been designated by FIRREA to serve as the DOTS, without
renewed advice and consent of the Senate, through the remainder of the period when
he would have served as Chairman of the FHLBB. 6 4
The DOTS is now included in the FDIA definition as the "appropriate Federal
banking agency" with respect to any savings association 65 or any SLHC. 166 The
DOTS has the authority to charter federal savings associations 67 and is responsible
for the examination, safe and sound operation and regulation of such entities.' 68 As
151. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 215 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821a).
152. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 215 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821a(f)).
153. See id. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 212 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (c)-Q)) (appointment of FDIC as
conservator or receiver), FIRREA, supra note I, § 216 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1822) (FDIC as receiver).
154. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 217(3)-(8) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)-(f), (h),(i), (k)).
155. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 401(a)(1). Butsee id. §§ 401(b) (disposition and winding up of affairs of the FSLIC
and FHLBB), (c) (transitional authority and status of FHLBB Chairman), (d) (status of employees), (e) (continuation of
services), (f) (savings provisions relating to FSLIC), (h)-(i) (continuation of orders, resolutions, determinations, and
regulations of FSLIC and FHLBB), 402(a),(b) (continuation and coordination of certain regulations).
156. Id. § 401(a)(2).
157. See id. § 301 (amending the Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (1988) [hereinafter HOLA].
Subsequent references to sections within HOLA refer to the sections designated within FIRREA, supra note 1, § 301.
158. HOLA, supra note 157, § 3(a).
159. See id. § 3(b) (establishment of position of the DOTS).
160. Id. § 3(e)(1).
161. Id. § 3(e)(2).
162. Id. § 3(c)(1)-(2).
163. Id. § 3(c)(1).
164. Id. § 3(c)(5). This carryover official, M. Danny Wall, has since resigned. See Nash, Top Savings Regulator
Resigns and Strikes Back at His Critics, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at AI, col. 1.
165. On the meaning of the term "savings association," see supra note 2.
166. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(f)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(4)).
167. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(a).
168. Id. § 4(a)(1). On examinations, see id. § 5(d)(1)(). As to safety and soundness supervision, the amended
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to the chartering and permitted activities of federally chartered savings associations
under section 5 of the HOLA, the DOTS has statutory authority to enforce that
section, as well as the general enforcement provisions of section 8 of the FDIA,169
and regulations promulgated thereunder.170 The DOTS is authorized to issue regu-
lations appropriate to carry out statutory responsibilities.' 7' The DOTS is also
charged with the responsibility of prescribing by regulation uniform accounting and
disclosure standards for savings associations. 172
The DOTS is also given exclusive power and jurisdiction to appoint a conser-
vator or receiver for a federally chartered savings association,1 73 and the DOTS has
authority to promulgate regulations for the reorganization, consolidation, liquidation,
and dissolution of savings associations, for mergers between insured savings asso-
ciations, and for savings associations in conservatorship or receivership and the
conduct thereof. 174 In addition, under statutorily specified grounds, the DOTS has the
power and jurisdiction to appoint a conservator or receiver for an insured state-
chartered savings association. 75
Establishment or acquisition of a subsidiary by a savings association, or the
initiation of a new activity through an existing subsidiary requires thirty-day prior
notification to the FDIC and to the DOTS.176 Conduct of the activities of such
subsidiaries is subject to regulations and orders of the DOTS. 177 Both the FDIC and
the DOTS have authority under the general enforcement provisions of the FDIA 178
with respect to subsidiaries of savings associations, 179 and the DOTS has also been
given divestiture power with respect to such subsidiaries. 8 0
In addition, the FDIC has authority, by regulation or order, to determine that any
specific activity poses a serious threat to the SAIF and to order that no SAIF member
HOLA specifies that "[aill regulations and policies of the [DOTS] governing the safe and sound operation of savings
associations .... shall be no less stringent than those established by the Comptroller of the Currency for national banks."
Id. § 4(c).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1988).
170. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(d)(l)(A).
171. Id. § 4(a)(2).
172. Id. § 4(b)(1).
173. Id. § 5(d)(2)(E). On the grounds for appointment of a conservator or receiver for a federally chartered savings
association, see id. §§ 5(d)(2)(A) (mandatory grounds), 5(d)(2)(B) (additional grounds; consent of the association, or
removal from membership in a federal home loan bank or from status as insured institution).
174. Id. § 5(d)(3)(A). In cases where the FDIC or the RTC is the conservator or receiver, DOTS regulations must
be consistent with regulations prescribed by the FDIC. Id. § 5(d)(3)(B). On the RTC, see infra notes 190-92 and
accompanying text.
175. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(d)(2)(C). Written approval of the state official with jurisdiction over the insured
association, indicating that one or more of the statutory grounds exists, is generally necessary for the exercise of this
authority by the DOTS. Id. § 5(d)(2)(D)(i). But cf. id. § 5(d)(2)(D)(ii) (authority of DOTS to proceed with appointment
under certain circumstances).
176. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(1)(A)). This provision does not apply to
federal savings banks chartered prior to October 15, 1982, as a state-chartered savings bank or to savings associations that
acquired their principal assets from institutions chartered prior to October 15, 1982, as a state-chartered savings bank.
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(5)(A),(B)).
177. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(1)(B)).
178. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1988).
179. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(2)(A)).
180. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(m)(2)(B)).
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engage directly in any such activity. 8 1 This provision does not limit the authority of
the DOTS to issue safety and soundness regulations generally, or to enforce com-
pliance with other laws as applicable.18 2
With respect to permissible activities of savings associations, newly subjected to
general limitations under the FDIA, 183 equity investments, whether by a state or
federally chartered savings association,1 84 are limited to those investments permis-
sible for federal savings associations. 185 The FDIC has the responsibility to require
divestiture of impermissible equity investments "as quickly as can be prudently done,
and in any event not later than July 1, 1994." 186 Similarly, savings associations are
generally prohibited from acquiring or retaining, directly or through a subsidiary, any
corporate debt security not of investment grade.187
The Federal Home Loan Bank System has also been transformed by FIRREA.
With the abolition of the FHLBB, there has now been established a Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB).1 88 The FHFB is intended, inter alia, to supervise the federal
home loan banks (FHLBs) in carrying out their housing finance mission. 189
Three new regulatory entities have been created to "resolve" all cases involving
FSLIC-insured institutions placed in conservatorship or receivership between January
1, 1989, and the date of enactment of FIRREA, or to be so placed within the
three-year period following that enactment. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
has been established1 90 for the express purpose, inter alia, of managing and resolving
such cases. 191 The RTC is under the exclusive management of the FDIC. 192
181. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1828(m)(3)(A)). See also FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 221(4) (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1828(m)(3)(C)) (additional authority of FDIC; serious risks to SAIF and BI).
182. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1828(m)(3)(B)).
183. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(a),(b)). These provisions do not require
divestiture by a savings association of any assets acquired prior to the enactment of the FIRREA. FIRREA, supra note
1, § 222 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(g)(2)).
184. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1831e(c)(1)).
185. Id. There is an exception from this limitation provided for service corporations. See FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 183le(c)(2)).
186. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 183le(c)(3)(A)). For the treatment of noncompliance
during the divestment process, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1831e(c)(3)(B)).
187. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1831e(d)(1)). For these purposes, the term "corporate
debt security not of investment grade" does not include obligations issued or guaranteed by a corporation that may be held
by a federal savings association under the newly amended HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(c)(1)(D)-(F). FIRREA, supra note
1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1831e(d)(4)(C)). The term "investment grade" is defined for these purposes to mean
a security that, "when acquired by the savings association or subsidiary, was rated in one of the 4 highest rating categories
by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization." FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 U.S.c.
§ 1831e(d)(4)(A)). For an exception from this prohibition for debt securities held by a "qualified affiliate" of a savings
association, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1831e(d)(2)). On the definition of "qualified
affiliate" for these purposes, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1831e(d)(4)(B)). Under certain
circumstances, with the approval of the DOTS, ineligible corporate debt securities may be transferred in exchange for
"qualified notes." See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 222 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(e)).
188. FIRREA, supra note I, § 702(a) (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1422a(a)(1)).
189. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 702(a) (codified at 12 u.S.C. §§ 1422a(a)(3)(B), 1422b(a)(1)) (powers and
duties of FHFB). See also FIRREA, supra note 1, § 709 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1431) (powers and duties of FHLBs).
On eligibility of insured depository institutions for membership in the FHLBs, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 704(a)
(codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1424(a)).
190. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501(a) (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1421a(b)(1)).
191. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1421a(b)(3)).
192. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 u.S.C. § 1421a(b)(1)(C)).
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In addition, FIRREA has established the Oversight Board193 to oversee and be
accountable for the RTC. 194 The Oversight Board consists of five members:1 95 the
Secretary of the Treasury, who serves as chairperson; 196 the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development; and two independent members appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 197 The term of the first three members is cotermi-
nous with the period of his or her responsibilities specified in sections 501 and 511198
of FIRREA. 199 The two independent members have three-year terms.2°° While the
FDIC has management responsibility for the RTC, the Oversight Board has the
responsibility, inter alia, to develop and establish overall strategies, policies, and
goals of the RTC's activities in consultation with the RTC,201 to approve, prior to
their implementation, periodic financing requests developed by the RTC,202 to au-
thorize the use of proceeds from funds provided by the Treasury Department and from
any financing by the newly created Resolution Funding Corporation (REFCO), and
to oversee collection of funds by the REFCO.203
Finally, FIRREA has established the REFCO, 20 4 as the mechanism for providing
funds to the RTC. REFCO will issue nonvoting capital stock to the FHLBs 205 as well
as debt obligations, 206 will purchase capital certificates issued by the RTC,207 and in
addition will transfer statutorily specified amounts to the RTC. 208
B. Chartering Authority and Related Powers
FDIC authority is confirmed by FIRREA to organize any "new bank," i.e., a
new national bank in the same community as a bank in default to assume the insured
deposits of the latter and otherwise to perform, temporarily, functions specified in
FIRREA.209 New banks require authorization of the Comptroller to transact any other
business. 210 In addition, when one or more insured banks are in default, or the FDIC
anticipates that they may come into default, the FDIC has the authority to organize,
193. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(1)).
194. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(2)).
195. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(3)(A)).
196. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(3)(C)).
197. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(3)(A)(iv)).
198. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 511 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b).
199. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(3)(D)).
200. Id.
201. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(6)(A)).
202. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(6)(B)).
203. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421a(a)(6)(G)).
204. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(b)).
205. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(d)(1)). See also FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(e)) (capitalization of REFCO).
206. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(d)(3)). See also FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(f)) (obligations of the REFCO).
207. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(d)(2)).
208. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 511(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1421b(d)(2), (e)(8)).
209. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 213 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m)).
210. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 213 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m)(9)).
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and the Comptroller to charter, "bridge banks" to assume deposits of such insured
banks.211
Federal chartering of savings associations 2 12 is within the authority of the
DOTS, under such regulations as the DOTS may provide, "giving primary consid-
eration [to] the best practices of thrift institutions in the United States.' '213 A charter
may be granted only upon the satisfaction of the following statutory conditions:
(z) that the persons to whom the charter is to be issued are of good character and
responsibility;
(ii) that, in the judgment of the DOTS, necessity exists for such an institution in the
community to be served;
(ii) that there is a reasonable probability of the association's usefulness and success; and,
(iv) that the institution can be established without undue injury to properly conducted
existing local thrift and home financing institutions. 2 4
Upon receiving its charter, a federal savings association21 5 automatically be-
comes a member of the FHLB in the district in which the association is located or,
if convenience requires and the DOTS approves, in an adjoining district.21 6
A federal savings association may act as a trustee, executor, administrator,
guardian, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which a state bank, trust company, or
other corporation that competes with federal savings associations is permitted to act
under the laws of the state in which the federal savings association is located, upon
the issuance of a special permit by the DOTS.2 17 Subject to regulations to be pro-
mulgated by the DOTS, service corporations2 t 8 may invest in federally or state-
chartered corporations located in the state in which the home office of the federal
savings association is located and which are engaged in trust activities.2 19 In review-
ing trust applications, the DOTS may consider the following statutory factors:
(t) the amount of capital of the applicant federal savings association;220
(ii) the sufficiency of the capital under the circumstances;
(iii) the needs of the community to be served; and
(iv) other facts and circumstances that the DOTS deems to be proper.22'
211. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 214 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)). To the extent that a bridge bank assumes any
insured deposits, all insured deposits of the insured bank must be assumed by the bridge bank or another insured
depository institution. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 214 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(1)(B)(i)).
212. On the definition of "savings association" for these purposes, see HOLA, supra note 157, § 2(4), referring
to 12 U.S.C. § 1813. See also supra note 2 (definition under the FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b) (1989)).
213. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(a).
214. Id. § 5(e)(l)-(4).
215. On the definition of "federal savings association," see id. § 2(5). See also supra note 2 (definition under the
FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b) (1989)).
216. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(f). Newly chartered federal savings associations must qualify for membership in
same manner under the Home Loan Bank Act as other members. Id. On membership, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 704(a)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1424(a)).
217. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(n)(1).
218. On the limitations on investments by federal savings associations in service corporations, see id. § 5(c)(4)(B).
219. Id. § 5(n)(1).
220. A permit may not be issued if the applicant has capital in an amount less than required by state law of
state-chartered banks, trust companies, and corporations exercising such trust powers. Id. § 5(n)(8).
221. Id. § 5(n)(8)(A)-(D). On surrender or revocation of trust powers, see id. § 5(n)(9), (10), respectively.
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C. Supervision and Enforcement with Respect to Management of Depository
Institutions
FLRREA has undertaken a significant expansion and enhancement of regulatory
enforcement and criminal liability provisions with respect to depository institutions
and their management. 222 Among other things, it gives express authority to the FDIC
to take enforcement action against savings associations, in the absence of action by
the DOTS in accordance with FDIC recommendations. 223
The FIRREA provisions expanding the enforcement authority of the federal
regulators will result in significant changes in the substance and procedures of the
process of regulatory enforcement. 224 However, in light of the dramatic expansion
and enhancement of enforcement powers granted to the regulators it may be signif-
icant that they are now required by FIRREA to adopt certain reforms in the
process,225 first advocated by this author,226 that hold some promise for adjusting the
balance between regulator and regulated in the enforcement context. 227
D. Supervision of Changes in Control
FIRREA has amended the Change in Bank Control Act (CBCA)228 to indicate
expressly that, under certain specified circumstances, the resignation, termination of
employment or participation, divestiture of control, or separation of or by an "in-
stitution-affiliated party" 229 does not affect the jurisdiction and authority of the
appropriate federal banking agency to proceed against such a party under the
CBCA. 230 Civil money penalties for violations of the CBCA have been expanded and
increased. 231
E. Capital Standards
The amended HOLA directs the DOTS, consistent with the purposes of section
908 of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983232 and the capital require-
ments established thereunder by the federal banking regulators, 233 to require all
222. For a detailed discussion of these developments, see infra notes 286-338 and accompanying text. See also
Board of Governors, SR89-17 (FI5), Aug. 17, 1989, reprinted in 3 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 35,340 (Sept. 8,
1989) (memorandum discussing enforcement and related provisions of FIRREA).
223. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 912 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(t)).
224. See infra notes 286-343 and accompanying text (discussion of changes in the regulatory enforcement process
resulting from the FIRREA provisions).
225. See infra notes 339-43 and accompanying text (discussion of FIRREA-mandated reforms in regulatory
enforcement process).
226. See Malloy, supra note 34, at 791-97.
227. See infra notes 344-84 and accompanying text (concluding observations concerning FIRREA-mandated
reforms).
228. 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (1988). On the CBCA and its regulatory implementation, see 1 M. MALLOY, supra note
1, at 266-84.
229. On the meaning of the term of art "institution-affiliated party," introduced by FIRREA, see infra notes
286-90 and accompanying text.
230. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(15)).
231. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18170)).
232. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1988).
233. On capital standards applicable to banks, see I M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at 452-58.
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savings associations to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing mini-
mum capital levels and by using other methods as determined to be appropriate by the
DOTS.234 Consistent with provisions concerning capital standards, 235 the DOTS may
establish minimum capital levels on a case-by-case basis, by amount, or at a capital-
to-assets ratio.23 6 Failure by a savings association to maintain capital at or above the
minimum level may be treated by the DOTS as an unsafe or unsound practice.23 7 The
DOTS is also authorized to issue capital directives,2 38 and to enforce directives and
capital plans approved thereunder in the same manner as outstanding, final orders
issued under the general enforcement provisions of the FDIA.2 9 Progress in com-
plying with any capital plan may be taken into account by the DOTS in considering
any other proposal by a savings association or affiliate that would have the effect of
diverting earnings, diminishing capital, or otherwise impeding progress with respect
to the capital plan.2 40 Such a proposal may be disapproved if the DOTS determines
that it would adversely affect the ability of the association to comply with a capital
plan.241
The amended HOLA also requires the DOTS to prescribe by regulation and
maintain uniformly applicable capital standards for savings associations. 242 The pre-
scribed capital standards must include: (i) a "leverage limit" of core capital243 in an
amount not less than three percent of a savings association's total assets;244 (ii) a
"tangible capital" 245 requirement in an amount not less than 1.5 percent of a savings
association's total assets;246 and (iii) a risk-based capital requirement. 247 The pre-
scribed standards must be no less stringent than those applicable to national banks.248
The DOTS final regulations in this regard must be promulgated not later than 90 days,
and effective not later than 120 days, after enactment of FIRREA.249 In general,
investments in and extensions of credit to a subsidiary engaged in activities not
permissible for a national bank are to be deducted from the capital of a savings
234. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(s)(1)(A),(B).
235. See id. § 5(t). See also infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
236. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(s)(2).
237. Id. § 5(s)(3).
238. Id. § 5(s)(4)(A).
239. Id. § 5(s)(4)(B). See 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1988) (FDIA enforcement provision).
240. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(s)(5)(A).
241. Id. § 5(s)(5)(B).
242. Id. § 5(t)(1)(A).
243. On the definition of "core capital" for these purposes, see id. § 5(t)(9)(A).
244. Id. § 5(t)(l)(A)(i). (2)(A).
245. The term "tangible capital" is defined for these purposes to mean core capital less any intangible assets. Id.
§ 5(t)(9)(C). But see id. § 5(t)(3) (transition rule permitting inclusion of "qualifying supervisory goodwill" in calculation
of core capital of certain eligible savings associations through December 31, 1994). See also id. § 5(t)(3)(B) (meaning
of "eligible savings association"), (9)(B) (definition of "qualifying supervisory goodwill").
246. Id. § 5(t)(l)(A)(ii), (2)(B).
247. Id. § 5(t)(1)(A)(iii), (2)(C). A savings association is not in compliance with the statutory capital standards
unless it complies with all three prescribed standards. Id. § 5(t)(1)(B). On the legal consequences of a failure to comply
with the capital standards, see id. § 5(t)(6)-(7).
248. Id. § 5(t)(1)(C).
249. Id. § 5(t)(1)(D).
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association. 250 In calculating compliance with applicable capital adequacy standards,
unidentifiable intangible assets generally may not be included if acquired after April
12, 1989.251
Given the likely difficulty that savings associations will encounter in complying
with anything close to the capital adequacy standards dictated under these provisions
of FIRREA, 252 we shall no doubt see the issue of capital standards revisited, as a new
"crisis," upon the promulgation and application of the FIRREA-mandated regula-
tions. Yet to criticize FIRREA as imposing too stringent a standard is to suggest that
it is intolerably impolitic to require savings associations to meet standards that are
unremarkable among other depository institutions.
F. Securities Disclosure
FIRREA has made conforming amendments to section 12(i) of the 1934 Act253
so that the section now refers to "banks and savings associations"254 and deletes the
reference to "institutions the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation. " 255 It also strikes the language identifying the
FSLIC as a delegated regulator under the section, and instead identifies the Office of
Thrift Supervision as the delegated regulator "with respect to savings associations the
accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. '256
G. Holding Company Regulation
FIRREA draws the provisions governing the regulation of SLHCs into the
HOLA itself.Z57 For these purposes, an SLHC is defined to mean any company 258 that
directly or indirectly controls a savings association259 or that controls any other
company which is an SLHC. 260
FIRREA also amends section 4 of the BHCA26t expressly to facilitate thrift
acquisitions by BHCs, 262 not limited to acquisitions of failing thrifts. In addition,
250. Id. § 5(t)(5)(A). But see id. § 5(t)(5)(B),(C) (exceptions from separate capitalization of subsidiaries), (5)(D)
(transition rule). See also id. § 5(t)(8) (temporary authority of DOTS to make exceptions for eligible savings associations).
251. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(n)). However, such unidentifiable intangibles
may be included to the extent permitted under the capital standards provisions of newly amended HOLA, supra note 157,
§ 5(t). FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(n)).
252. See Thomas, S&L Law's Language on Capital Rules Has Left Officials Split on What It Says, wall St. J., Sept.
7, 1989, at A3, col. 2 (depending upon interpretation of FIRREA capital standard provisions, 900 to 1,400 savings
associations would fail to comply in their present condition). Cf. Rosenstein, supra note 132, at 2 (discussing difficulty
for savings associations in meeting a 6% capital standard).
253. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982). On the application of the 1934 Act to securities issued by banks and thrift institutions
(now known generically as savings associations), see 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at 491-93.
254. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 744(u)(2)(A)(i) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 781(i)).
255. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 744(u)(2)(A)(ii).
256. Id. § 744(u)(2)(A)(iii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 781(i)(4)).
257. See generally FIRREA, supra note I, § 301 (HOLA, supra note 157, § 10, regulation of holding companies).
On the regulation of SLHCs, see generally 2 M. MALLOY, supra note I, at 755-86.
258. On the definition of "company" for these purposes, see HOLA, supra note 157, § 10(a)(1)(C).
259. On the meaning of the term "savings association," see id. § 10(a)(1)(A). See also supra note 2.
260. HOLA, supra note 157, § 10(a)(1)(D).
261. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1989).
262. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 601(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i)(1)). For a discussion of the previous policy,
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FIRREA indicates that no special restrictions on transactions between such acquired
institutions and their holding company affiliatesare to be imposed by the Fed beyond
those restrictions generally applicable. 263 The Fed is required to remove any such
restrictions on pre-FIRREA thrift acquisitions. 264
FIRREA also makes technical amendments to the BHCA, conforming the Act's
definitional and approval provisions to the generic use in FIRREA of the terminology
"savings association''265 and "depository institution. ' 266 Similarly, it makes sub-
stantive and technical amendments to BHCA provisions with respect to passive
investments by companies controlling certain nonbank banks,267 and permits the
purchase of minority interests in undercapitalized savings associations by BHCs.263
H. Mergers and Acquisitions
FIRREA has also amended the Bank Merger Act (BMA),269 in light of the
significant changes in the federal regulatory structure. The FDIC is identified as the
"responsible agency" for approval with respect to covered mergers and acquisitions
"if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a State nonmember insured
bank (except a District [of Columbia] bank or a savings bank supervised by the
[DOTS]). '"270 In addition, the newly created DOTS is now identified as the "re-
sponsible agency" for approval with respect to covered mergers and acquisitions "if
the acquiring, assuming, or resulting institution is to be a savings association." 271
I. Conversions
Conversions of any savings association that is or is eligible to become a member
of an FHLB into a federal savings association, and any accompanying conversion
from mutual to stock or stock to mutual form,272 will be subject to regulations
prescribed by the DOTS. 273 Further, any federal savings association may change its
generally limiting thrift acquisitions by BHCs to troubled or failing thrift institutions, see 2 M. MALLOY, supra note 1,
at 727-28, n.9.
263. FIRREA, supra note I, § 601(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(i)(2)).
264. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 601(b).
265. See id. § 602(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18410)(1)-(2)) (BHCA definition of "savings association" and
"insured institution").
266. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 602(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(e)) (substituting "insured depository
institution as defined in section 3" for "insured bank as defined in section 3(h)").
267. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 603 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f)(2)(A)(ii), (10)-(l1)). On the meaning of
"nonbank bank" and its regulation under the BHCA, see 2 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, at 725-55.
268. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 604(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(f)(2)(A), (12)-(13)). The FIRREA also
amends § 205 of the Depository Institutions Management Interlocks Act to exempt certain specified interlocks by a single
management official in connection with the purchase of a minority interest in an undercapitalized savings association by
a savings and loan holding company. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 604(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3204(9)).
269. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1989). For a discussion of the BMA and its regulatory implementation, see 2 M.
MA.LOY, supra note 1, at 799-819.
270. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 221(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(C)).
271. FIRREA, supra note I, § 221(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(D)).
272. Conversion of any savings association from mutual to stock or stock to mutual form is prohibited except in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the DOTS. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(i)(2)(A).
273. Id. § 5(i)(1).
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designation from a federal savings association to a federal savings bank, or vice
versa.274
A federal savings association may convert into a state savings association or
savings bank, organized under the laws of the state in which the principal office of
the association is located, if the following conditions are met:
(i) the state permits conversion of state savings associations or savings banks into federal
savings associations;
(i) the conversion is determined upon the requisite vote, in person or by proxy, of
members or stockholders of the association in accordance with state law, but in no event by
less than fifty-one percent of the votes cast at the members' or stockholders' meeting, and
upon compliance with any other requirements reciprocally equivalent to the requirements of
state law for conversion of a state-chartered institution into a federal savings association;
(iii) requisite notice of the meeting is given;27S
(iv) if the converted institution is mutual in form, upon dissolution after conversion the
members or shareholders will share on a mutual basis in the assets of the association in exact
proportion to their relative share or account credits;
(v) if the converted institution is stock in form, upon dissolution after conversion the
stockholders will share on an equitable basis in the assets of the association; and
(v) the conversion shall be effective on the date that all provisions of the HOLA have
been fully complied with, and upon the issuance of the new charter by the state in which the
association is located. 276
Conversion of a BIF-member state savings bank into a federal savings bank is
permitted if authorized, subject to the provisions of the amended HOLA277 and
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the DOTS. 278 The DOTS is authorized to
provide for the organization, incorporation, operation, examination, and regulation of
such converted savings banks. 279 Such a converted savings bank continues to be a
BIF member until such time as it changes its status to an SAIF member. 280
Consistent with the purposes of the HOLA, the DOTS has also been authorized,
notwithstanding any other provision of law: (i) to approve or (in the case of a federal
savings association) to require conversion of a mutual savings association or an
FDIC-insured federal mutual savings bank into a federal stock savings association or
federal stock savings bank; (ii) to charter a federal stock savings association or federal
stock savings bank to acquire the assets of such a mutual institution; or (iii) to charter
a federal stock savings association or federal stock savings bank to merge with such
a mutual institution. 28' Such a conversion is authorized only if one of the following
conditions is met:
274. Id. § 5(i)(2)(C).
275. For the notice requirements, see id. § 5(i)(3)(A)(iii).
276. Id. § 5(i)(3)(A)(i)-(vi).
277. See id. § 5(o)(2)(B)-(E).
278. Id. § 5(o)(1).
279. Id.
280. Id. § 5(o)(2)(A).
281. Id. § 5(p)(l).
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(i) the DOTS determines that severe financial conditions exist that threaten the stability of
the association to be converted and that the conversion is likely to improve the financial
condition of the association;
(ii) the FDIC has contracted to provide assistance to the association under section 13 of
the FDIA;282 or
(ii) the conversion is intended to assist an institution in receivership. 283
A federal savings bank chartered under these provisions would have the same
authority and be subject to the same applicable restrictions if it had been chartered as
a federal savings bank under any other provision of the HOLA.284 In addition, it
could engage in any investment, activity, or operation that the acquired institution
was engaged in, if the latter was a federal savings bank, or would have been autho-
rized to engage in if the latter had converted to a federal charter. 285
IV. ENHANCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT POWERS UNDER FIRREA
One of the clearest indications of the direction in which FIRREA takes federal
depository institutions law with respect to the enhancement of enforcement powers is
a simple definitional amendment. A new term of art is introduced into the FDIA with
the enactment of the term "institution-affiliated party." An "institution-affiliated
party" is defined as:
(1) any director, officer, employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a bank holding
company) of, or agent for, an insured depository institution;
(2) any other person who has filed or is required to file a change-in-control notice[25 6] with
the appropriate Federal banking agency under [12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)];
(3) any shareholder (other than a bank holding company), consultant, joint venture part-
ner, and any other person as determined by the appropriate Federal banking agency (by
regulation or case-by-case) who participates in the conduct of the affairs of an insured
depository institution; and
(4) any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser, or accountant) who
knowingly or recklessly participates in-
(A) any violation of any law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice,[ 287] which caused or is likely to cause more than a
minimal financial loss to,[2 8s] or a significant adverse effect on, the insured depository
institution. 289
282. 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (1988).
283. HOLA, supra note 157, § 5(p)(2)(A)-(C).
284. Id. § 5(p)(3).
285. Id.
286. On persons required to file change-in-control notices, see 1 M. MALLOy, supra note 1, at 271, 276-77.
287. For a discussion of the meaning of the term "unsafe or unsound practice," see Malloy, supra note 34, at
769-74.
288. Without a doubt, much ink will be spilled on the subject of what constitutes "more than a minimal financial
loss" to an institution. Cf., e.g., Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Jefferson Parish v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651
F.2d 259,264 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (potential loss of $80,000 on assets of $75,000,000
not an abnormal risk of loss; no "unsafe or unsound practice" involved in S&L's practices). An analogy might be drawn
for these purposes to the guiding concept of "materiality" as a basis for a fraud action in federal securities law. See
generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (discussing meaning of "materiality").
289. FIRREA, supra note I, § 204(f)(6) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)).
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A corresponding definitional provision has been added by FIRREA to the FCUA. 290
Thus, the categories of individual persons subject to the general regulatory
enforcement authority of the federal regulators have been expanded through the
substitution of the generic concept of "institution-affiliated parties" for such specific
concepts as director, officer, employee, agent, or "other person participating in the
conduct of the affairs" of an institution.291 The enforcement provisions of the FDIA
are also expanded to cover not only "banks" but all "depository institutions.' '292 The
latter term includes "savings associations, ' 293 and the DOTS is the "appropriate
Federal banking agency" charged with authority under the FDIA enforcement pro-
visions with respect to these associations. 294 In addition, the FDIA enforcement
authority now applies to SLHCs and nonbanking subsidiaries of SLHCs, in the same
manner as it applies to these associations. 295 As these authorities parallel the statutory
authority formerly exercised by the FHLBB and the FSLIC, 296 presumably the case
law interpreting the latter will remain pertinent in interpreting the authority now placed
with the DOTS, except to the extent that FIRREA has substantively altered that
authority.
Had nothing else changed in the enforcement powers granted the regulators,
FIRREA would still have represented an important development in regulatory en-
forcement. The reach of these enforcement powers would extend beyond the rela-
tively narrow categories of director, officer, employee, agent, and management
participant to reach such peripheral participants as persons subject to the change-
in-control notice requirements 297 and independent contractors like attorneys, apprais-
290. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 901(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(r)), defining the term for purposes of the
FCUA as follows:
(1) any committee member, director, officer, or employee of, or agent for, an insured credit union;
(2) any consultant, joint venture partner, and any other person as determined by the [NCUA] Board (by
regulation or on a case-by-case basis) who participates in the conduct of the affairs of an insured credit union;
and
(3) any independent contractor (including any attorney, appraiser, or accountant) who knowingly or
recklessly participates in -
(A) any violation of any law or regulation;
(B) any breach of fiduciary duty; or
(C) any unsafe or unsound practice,
which caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal financial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on, the
insured credit union.
291. See, e.g., FIRREA, supra note I, § 901(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(r)) (defining "institution-affiliated
party" for purposes of the Federal Credit Union Act), FIRREA, supra note I, § 901(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b)(1), (c), (e)(4)-(f), (g)(1), (3), (h)(2), (1), (in)) (utilizing new terminology in FDIA cease and desist, temporary
cease and desist, suspension and removal, summary suspension and removal powers), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 901(b)(2)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(e)(1), (f), (i)(1), (3), (0)(2), (o)) (utilizing new terminology in corresponding FCUA powers).
292. See FIRREA, supra note I. § 901(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818) (substituting "depository institution(s)"
for "bank(s)" throughout the section). Cf. supra note I (meaning of "depository institution").
293. See FIRREA, supra note 1. § 204(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(1)). See also supra note 2.
294. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 204(f)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(4)).
295. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(8)).
296. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(k) (1988) with id. §§ 1464(d)(2)-(15), 1730(b)-(q).
297. Such persons might be acquiring as little as 10% of the outstanding voting shares of the depository institution.
See I M. MAU.OY, supra note 1, at 276-77 (discussion of CBCA-implementing regulations establishing rebuttable
presumption of "control" for certain acquisitions of 10% of voting shares). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1817(0)(1), (8)(B)
(1988) (Change in Bank Control Act notice requirements triggered by acquisition of "control," broadly defined).
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ers, and accountants under specified circumstances. While such participants may
have been subject to suits on behalf of a depository institution by a receiver once the
institution had failed, 298 their inclusion within the concept of "institution-affiliated
party" now gives the regulators preventive authority before matters have reached the
dire straits of the actual failure of the institution.
In fact, much else has changed in the enforcement powers, so that not only the
scope (as to potential enforcement targets) but also the impact of these powers has
expanded in significant ways. FIRREA's expansion of the cease and desist and
temporary cease and desist authority299 contains, inter alia, an apparent repudiation
of the Seventh Circuit's en banc decision in Larimore v. Conover,300 and now
expressly authorizes-contrary to Larimore-orders requiring restitution or reim-
bursement, indemnification, or guarantee against loss in certain specified cir-
cumstances. 301 This authority to order affirmative corrective action includes the
power to order restrictions on the growth of a depository institution, disposal of a loan
or other asset involved in a violation or unsafe or unsound practice, and employment
of qualified officers or employees (subject to regulatory approval). 30 2
The grounds for issuance of a temporary cease and desist order have been
amended. Pre-FIRREA, a regulatory agency was required to make a determination
that a violation or practice "is likely to cause insolvency or substantial dissipation of
assets or earnings of the bank, or is likely to seriously weaken the condition of the
bank or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of its depositors prior to the
completion of the [cease and desist] proceedings" 30 3 before a temporary cease and
desist order could be issued. FIRREA provides for issuance of a temporary order
upon any of the following alternative findings:
(i) that the violation or practice is likely to cause insolvency of the depository institution
involved, a ground that is unchanged by FIRREA, except for its broader application to any
"depository institution; '" 30 4
(ii) that the violation or practice is likely to cause significant, rather than "substantial,"
,dissipation of assets or earnings of the depository institution, a change in standard that was
intended to "lower the agencies' burden of proof... and... cover anything more than a
minimal or nominal dissipation of assets;" 305 or
298. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (malpractice
action by FDIC as assignee of failed bank against bank's former accountant).
299. See FIRREA, supra note I, § 902 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)-(c), 1786(e)-(f)).
300. 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986), reversing, 775 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1985). For a critique of Larimore, see
Malloy, supra note 34, at 780-81.
301. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i)-(ii)) (amending FDIA),
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(e)(3)(A)(i)-(ii)) (amending FCIUA).
302. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(B)-(F)) (amending FDIA),
902(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(e)(3)(B)-(F)) (amending FCUA). See also FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(1)(C)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(7)) (adding FDIA authority to order limitations on activities or functions of institution
or institution-affiliated party), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(e)(4)) (adding corre-
sponding FCUA authority).
303. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (1988). See id. § 1786()(1) (corresponding FCUA provision).
304. Cf. supra note 292.
305. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 222, supra note 10, at 439.
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(iii) that the violation or practice is likely to weaken (rather than "seriously weaken") the
condition of the bank or otherwise prejudice (rather than "seriously prejudice") the interests
of the institution's depositors. 3 6
A temporary cease and desist order may include an order restricting the growth
of the depository institution involved.3 0 7 Temporary orders are also authorized to deal
with situations in which pertinent books and records are so inaccurate that the en-
forcing agency is unable to determine, in the normal supervisory process, what the
financial condition of the involved depository institution might be, or cannot deter-
mine the details or purpose of any transaction that might have a material effect on the
financial condition of the institution. 30 8 Such orders are effective upon service, and
they remain in effect (absent court action to the contrary) 30 9 until the completion of
the cease and desist proceedings, or until the agency determines, by examination or
otherwise, that the books and records are accurate and reflect the institution's finan-
cial condition. 310
General removal and prohibition authority has been substantially amended and
merged by FIRREA, 3 11 with temporary suspension or prohibition during the pen-
dency of a removal or prohibition action treated separately. 312 Removal or prohibition
of participation of an institution-affiliated party requires a determination, inter alia,
of actual or probable "financial loss or other damage," "prejudice[]" to depositors'
interests, or "financial gain or other benefit" to such party,3 13 rather than "substan-
tial financial loss" or "serious[] prejudice[]"- 3 14 as was the case pre-FIRREA. The
intention of these changes was to "allow[] the regulatory agencies to proceed with a
removal or prohibition action.., without requiring the agencies to quantify the harm
or prejudice. '315
FIRREA also resolves controversy over two specific types of situations involv-
ing the application of removal and prohibition orders. First, express authority is now
granted for industry-wide imposition of removal and prohibition orders, 3 16 an appli-
306. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1)) (amending FDIA),
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(f)(1)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
307. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2)(A)(iii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1)) (amending FDIA); FIRREA,
supra note 1, § 902(b)(2)(B)(iii) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(f)(1)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
308. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(3)(A)) (amending FDIA); FIRREA
supra note 1, § 902(b)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(f)(3)(A)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
309. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(3)(B)(ii)) (amending FDIA), citing
12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2); FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(b)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(f)(3)(B)(ii)) (corresponding
FCUA provision), citing 12 U.S.C. § 1786(")(2).
310. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(a)(2)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(ll)) (amending FDIA);
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 902(b)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(f)(3)(B)(ii)(l)-(n1)) (corresponding FCUA provi-
sion).
311. See FIRREA, supra note 1. § 903(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)) (amending FDIA); FIRREA,
supra note 1, § 903(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(1)) (corresponding FCUA provisions).
312. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 903(a)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(3)) (authorizing temporary suspension
or prohibition under FDIA); FIRREA, supra note 1, § 903(b)(2) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(3)) (corresponding
FCUA provisions).
313. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 903(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)) (amending FDIA);
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 903(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)) (corresponding FCUA provisions).
314. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(g)(1), 1818(e)(1) (1982).
315. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 222, supra note 10, at 439.
316. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 903(a)(3), (b)(3) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e)(6)(A), 1786(g)(5)(A), respec-
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cation of the removal/prohibition authority that excited some criticism pre-
FIRREA.317 Absent the written consent of the issuing agency and "the appropriate
Federal financial institutions regulatory agency," ' 318 any person 3t9 subject to re-
moval, suspension, or prohibition from participation is prohibited from holding office
in, or participating in the affairs of, any insured depository institution, a BHC or BHC
affiliate, 320 a foreign bank or holding company subject to section 8(a) of the Inter-
national Banking Act of 1978321 because of entry into the United States, 322 a savings
association, an insured credit union, or a farm credit bank.323 In addition, the indus-
try-wide ban extends to holding office or participating in the conduct of the affairs of
any of the federal depository institution regulators themselves, the FHFB, any FHLB,
and the RTC.324 Violations of industry-wide bans are treated as violations of an
order. 325
Second, under certain specified circumstances, express authority is also granted
to institute regulatory enforcement proceedings against institution-affiliated parties
tively) (referencing industry-wide removal/prohibition provisions), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(a) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)) (industry-wide removal/prohibition provision of FDIA), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(b) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
317. See Anonymous v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1985) (enjoining issuance of
industry-wide removal of bank director). For a discussion of the issues raised by Anonymous, see Alper, FDIC Suspension
and Removal Powers: An Industrywide Bar, 104 BANKINO L.J. 539 (1987).
318. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(B)) (FDIA industry-wide removal!
prohibition provisions; written consent). See also FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1786(g)(7)(B)) (corresponding FCUA provision). For these purposes, the term "appropriate Federal financial institu-
tions regulatory agency" is defined to mean:
(i) the appropriate Federal banking agency, in the case of an insured depository institution;
(ii) the Farm Credit Administration, in the case of an institution chartered under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;
(iii) the [NCUA] Board, in the case of an insured credit union...;
(iv) the Secretary of the Treasury, in the case of the [FHFB] and any [FHLB]; and
(v) the Oversight Board, in the case of the [RTC].
FIRREA, supra note I, § 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(D)(i)-(v)) (FDIA provision). For the corresponding
FCUA provision, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)(D)(i)-(v)). The FIRREA
requires consultation between the pertinent agencies before written consent may be provided. FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(E)) (FDIA provision), FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(b) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)(E)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
319. The industry-wide ban provisions are generally applicable to "persons" who are individuals, unless the
appropriate agency specifically finds that the provisions should apply to a corporation, firm or other business enterprise.
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(F)) (FDIA provision), FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 904(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)(F)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
320. The enforcement provisions now apply generally to BHCs and BHC affiliates. See FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 902(a)(1)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(3)) (applying FDIA enforcement provisions to BHCs and affiliates).
321. 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (1988), which subjects the following types of entities to specified provisions of federal
law:
Except as otherwise provided in this section (1) any foreign bank that maintains a branch or agency in a State,
(2) any foreign bank or foreign company controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial lending company
organized under State law, and (3) any company of which any foreign bank or company referred to in (1) and
(2) is a subsidiary....
322. The enforcement provisions now apply generally to such banks and companies. See FIRREA, supra note 1,
§ 902(a)(l)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(4)) (applying FDIA enforcement provisions to certain foreign banks and
holding companies).
323. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(A)(i)-(iv)). For the corresponding
provisions of the FCUA, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)(A)(i)-(iv)).
324. FIRREA, supra note I, § 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(A)(v)-(vii)). For the corresponding
provisions of the FCUA, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)(A)(v)-(vii)).
325. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 904(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(7)(C)) (FDIA provision); FIRREA, supra
note 1, § 904(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(g)(7)(C)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
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who have resigned, been terminated, or otherwise have separated from the institu-
tion.326 This provision repudiates the contrary result of the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Stoddard v. Board of Governors.327
FIRREA has also expanded the summary suspension and removal powers to
include state criminal proceedings as a ground for initiating proceedings. 328 Federal
criminal penalties for knowing participation in any institution's affairs in violation of
a removal or prohibition order have been clarified, 329 and criminal penalties for
knowing unauthorized participation by a convicted person have been increased. 330
In addition, civil money penalties have been expanded and increased. 33' Three
tiers of civil money penalties against depository institutions and institution-affiliated
parties have been established. The first tier imposes penalties not exceeding 5,000
dollars per day during the continuation of a violation of any law or regulation, of any
order or temporary order, of any written condition imposed in connection with the
grant of an application or other request, or of any written agreement between any
agency and a depository institution. 332 The second tier imposes penalties not exceed-
ing 25,000 dollars per day during the continuation of any such violation, when it
involves recklessly engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice, or breach of a fidu-
ciary duty, and where the violation, practice, or breach is part of a "pattern of
misconduct" that causes more than minimal loss to the depository institution, or
results in pecuniary gain or other benefit to such party. 333 The third tier imposes
maximum civil money penalties, which may amount to as much as one million dollars
per day 33 4 during the continuance of such a violation, practice or breach, in situations
326. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(3)) (FDIA separation-from-service
provision); FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(k)(3)) (corresponding FCUA provision). To
similar effect are the FIRREA's amendments of(z) the National Bank Act enforcement provision (see FIRREA, supra note
1. § 905(e) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 93(c))); (it) the civil money penalty provisions of the Federal Reserve Act (see
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(f),(g) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 504(m), 505(m))); (iii) penalty provisions of the HOLA,
supra note 157, § 10(i) (see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 9050)); (iv) enforcement provisions under the Change in Bank
Control Act (see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(15))); (v) general penalty provisions
under the FDIA (see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j)(6))); (v) the penalty provisions
of the BHCA (see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(i) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1847(c))); and (vii) the penalty provisions
of the anti-tying prohibitions of the BHCA Amendments of 1970 (see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 905(h) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1972(2)(I))).
327. 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Stoddard, see M. MALLOY, supra note 1, in 1989 Cum.
Supp. No.2 at 84.
328. See FIRREA, supra note I, § 906(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1)) (FDIA provision), FIRREA,
supra note 1. § 906(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(i)(1)) (corresponding FCUA provision).
329. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 908 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786 (1), 18180)).
330. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 910 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1785(d), 1829).
331. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b), 481,504, 505(1), 1467(i) [HOLA, supra
note 157, § 10(i)], 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(k)(2), 18170)(16), 1318(i)(2), 1828(j)(4)-(5), 1847, 1972(2)(F)). Cf. supra note
326 (separation-of-service provisions).
332. See, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)) (amending FDIA civil
money penalties provision).
333. See, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B)).
334. On the determination of the maximum penalties, see, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818 (i)(2)(D)). Mitigating factors with respect to the determination of any specific penalty under any of the
three tiers are specified in FIRREA. See, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(G)):
(i) the size of financial resources and good faith of the insured depository institution or other person charged;
(ii) the gravity of the violation;
(iii) the history of previous violations; and
(iv) such other matters as justice may require.
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where the depository institution or institution-affiliated party knowingly or recklessly
causes substantial loss to the institution or substantial pecuniary gain or other benefit
through the violation, practice, or breach. 335 Penalties are assessed and collected by
written notice, and the assessment is final and unappealable unless a hearing is
requested within the period of time specified by FIRREA.336
Among other things, FIRREA also increases penalties, on a similar three-tiered
basis, for failure to submit timely and accurate reports as required by federal law. 337
In addition, FIRREA has created significant authority for the federal regulators to
disapprove the proposed addition of any individual to the board of directors or the
employment of any individual as a senior executive officer of depository institutions
in certain specified circumstances. 338
These, then, are among the principal changes introduced by FIRREA to enhance
the administrative enforcement powers of the federal regulators of depository insti-
tutions. These changes embody a formidable array of expanded regulatory weapons
against impermissible conduct on the part of depository institutions and institution-
affiliated parties, both management participants and peripheral participants who are,
for the first time, brought directly within the regulatory scheme of administrative
enforcement. However, with increased power has come, to a modest degree, in-
creased responsibility. Consistent with recommendations made by the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS), 339 FIRREA now generally mandates the
publication and availability to the public of final orders issued with respect to ad-
ministrative enforcement proceedings initiated by such agencies, and of subsequent
modifications and terminations of such orders. 340
In addition, consistent with ACUS recommendations, 34' FIRREA has required,
before the end of the twenty-four-month period commencing with its enactment, that
the federal regulators jointly establish their own pool of ALJs for formal
adjudications. 342 The regulators are also required, within the same period, to develop
a set of uniform rules and procedures for administrative hearings, including provi-
sions for "summary judgment" rulings where there are no disputes as to material
facts of the case. 343
335. See, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(C)).
336. See, e.g., FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(E)). The institution or party
charged must submit a request for a hearing within 20 days of the issuance of the notice of assessment. See, e.g.,
FIRREA, supra note 1, § 907(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(H)). Cf. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 951 (authorizing
Attorney General to initiate civil action for civil penalties for specified bank-related criminal offenses).
337. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 911(b)-(f) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 161, 164, 324, 1782(a)(3), 1817(a)(1),
1847(d)).
338. See FIRREA, supra note 1, § 914.
339. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1989). See also Malloy, supra note 34, at 791-92.
340. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 913 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(u), 1786(s)). On the need for such improvements
in agency practice, see infra notes 348-54 and accompanying text.
341. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1989). See Malloy, supra note 34, at 795-97.
342. EIRREA, supra note I, § 916(1). On the need for such improvements in agency practice, see infra notes
357-63 and accompanying text.
343. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 916(2). See Malloy, supra note 34, at 793-94. On the need for such improvements
in agency practice, see infra notes 364-82 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The recent regulatory efforts at revising the rules of practice and procedure have
done much to change the topography of the terrain of formal administrative enforce-
ment proceedings, and FIRREA has significantly altered the composition of the
subsurface resources available to the regulators in such proceedings. The question
remains, however, whether depository institutions and institution-affiliated parties
that may be the subjects of such proceedings are likely to find themselves trapped in
a procedural sinkhole as they trek across this landscape. The truth is that there is
much for such institutions and parties to fear in FIRREA, but there is also some
glimmer of procedural reform on the horizon.
In November 1987 this author submitted a report to the ACUS identifying
several problems with the administrative practices concerning formal enforcement
proceedings and formulating some recommendations for reform. 344 These recom-
mendations were substantially adopted by the ACUS in December 1987, 3 45 but with
the addition of a recommendation that the agencies consider adopting a formal or
informal "precomplaint procedure," such as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's internal rule for "Wells submissions,"' 346 before action was taken to initiate a
formal enforcement proceeding. 347 Taken as a whole, the revisions promulgated or
proposed by the FDIC, FHLBB, and the OCC have done little to advance the
recommendations intended to achieve a modicum of administrative consistency and
balance in the application of the practice and procedure rules to targets of formal
enforcement proceedings. Ironically, FIRREA, which does so much to enhance the
power and effectiveness of the regulators, also appears to have made significant
strides towards achieving something of an appropriate balance between the regulators
and potential targets.
The extreme degree of confidentiality in which formal enforcement proceedings
have been wrapped 348 has generally extended even to the final orders issued in such
344. See Malloy, Adjudication Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 1987 ACUS
1215 (consultant report) [hereinafter ACUS Report].
345. See 52 Fed. Reg. 49,141, 49,151 (1987) (codified at I C.F.R. § 305.87-12).
346. See See. Ex. Act. Rel. No. 9796, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,010 (Sept. 27,
1972).
347. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,152 (1987):
The agencies should explore, in their circumstances, the utility of establishing a formal or informal procedure
to allow targets of investigations an opportunity to file a submission with the appropriate agency official before
official action is taken to initiate an enforcement proceeding.
This writer opposed this recommendation as of doubtful utility in light of the many informal opportunities afforded
for exchanges of views between potential targets and the agencies before a formal stance emerges. See ACUS Report,
supra note 344, at 1271-72 n.197. See also Malloy, supra note 34, at 755-56 n.196. Both the FDIC and the FHLBB
took the same position in their respective revisions. See 53 Fed. Reg. 51,659 (1988) (FDIC discussion of "Wells
submission" recommendation, citing with approval ACUS Report criticism of recommendation); 54 Fed. Reg. 26,352
(1989) (FHLBB discussion, citing with approval ACUS Report criticism of recommendation).
348. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 308.18(a)-(b) (1989) (FDIC revised provision):
(a) ... Hearings under this subpart B shall be private unless the [FDIC] Board or its designee determines,
after considering the views of the Respondent, that a public hearing is necessary to protect the public interest.
(b)... No Respo[n]dent shall disclose or otherwise use any information which is not publicly available and
which was obtained through discovery or at the hearing for any purpose other than litigation of the proceeding,
including appeals, if any.
See also id. § 509.25(b) (FHLBB revised provision, recommended and final decision and order confidential); 54 Fed.
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proceedings. 349 The secrecy surrounding the contents of final orders adversely affects
"the practical ability of counsel to research and to advise bank and bank officer
clients that may be potential respondents in possible enforcement actions. ' 35 0 It also
hampered the preparation and work of ALJs assigned from other, nonbanking agen-
cies to preside over the regulator's formal enforcement proceedings. 35 t
Responding to this problem, the ACUS adopted a recommendation that the
regulators make available, through regular publication or similarly accessible means
of dissemination, redacted versions of decisions and accompanying orders with re-
spect to formal enforcement proceedings. 352 As of the enactment of FIRREA, only
the FDIC had acted to implement the ACUS recommendation, instituting a commer-
cial publication program for redacted recommended and final decisions in formal
enforcement proceedings. 353 The FHLBB revision, published while FIRREA was in
the final stages of congressional consideration, explicitly continues confidentiality of
recommended and final decisions. 354
FIRREA has now given legal force to the ACUS recommendation, but with one
important limitation. The appropriate agency may make a determination in writing
"that the publication of any final order ... would seriously threaten the safety and
soundness of an insured depository institution, [and] delay the publication of such
order for a reasonable time."355 Given the near obsession with the secrecy of en-
forcement proceedings that seems to persist at some of the agencies, 35 6 there may be
Reg. 22,774 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19.44(a)) (OCC proposed revision; confidentiality of all papers and
documents in private proceedings).
349. See ACUS Report, supra note 344, at 1332-33: "[There is currently [November 1987] no publication or other
similar dissemination of the decisions in administrative adjudications." (Footnote omitted.)
350. Id. at 1333 (footnote omitted).
351. See, e.g., Letter from Marvin H. Morse, Chief Administrative Law Judge, to Marshall J. Breger, Chairman,
Administrative Conference of the United States, June 30, 1986, at 3 (confidentiality of enforcement proceedings leaves
few systematic opportunities to study the precedents; Al~s lacking specialized expertise).
352. 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1989).
353. See Malloy, supra note 1, in 1989 Cum. Supp. No. 2 (discussing FDIC publication program). But cf. infra note
356 (discussing post-FIRREA public availability of OCC and NCUA final orders).
354. See 12 C.F.R. § 509.25(b) (1989):
[Tihe entire record in any proceeding under this part, including, but not limited to, the . . . recommended
decision of the [AL], [and] the decision and order of the [FHLBB] ... shall not be made public, and shall be
for the confidential use only of the [FHLBB] and its staff, the [AL], the parties, and appropriate supervisory
authorities.
355. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 913(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u)(2)). For the corresponding exception under
the FCUA, see FIRREA, supra note 1, § 913(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1786(s)(2)).
356. See, e.g., ACUS Report, supra note 344, at 1222 n.9 (indirect resistance of OCC to access to enforcement
information on the part of ACUS consultant). The OCC has since announced that it will make publicly available
documents in enforcement at proceedings before ALJs. See OCC, NR 89-98, Oct. 27, 1989, citing FIRREA and the
ACUS recommendation in this regard. In October 1989, the NCUA promulgated in final form revisions of its regulations
governing administrative actions, adjudicative hearings, and rules of practice and procedure. 54 Fed. Reg. 43,280 (1989)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 747). The revised regulations include a provision, in accordance with FIRREA, relating to
public availability of final orders, as follows:
(a) The [NCUA] Board will make available to the public all: (1) Final enforcement orders issued pursuant to
this [P]art; and (2) modifications to or terminations of such orders.
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the [NCUA] Board may delay publication of an order if it makes a
determination in writing that such publication would seriously threaten the safety and soundness of an insured
credit union.
(c) All final orders published pursuant to this Part shall be made available in the library of the Office of the
General Counsel, NCUA, 1776 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20456.
54 Fed. Reg. at 43,283 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 747.122).
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a great temptation to invoke this FIRREA exception uncritically. If this were to
occur, the whole purpose of the FIRREA publication mandate would be frustrated.
The problem raised by the lack of publicly available final decisions has been
exacerbated by the fact that, despite statutory requirements to the contrary, 357 the
depository institutions' regulators have not employed their own ALJs, but instead
have relied on interagency loans of detailed ALJs. 35 8 Except where an ALJ happens
to have been repeatedly detailed, this practice raises a serious potential for inconsis-
tency in procedure, in decisions, and in the overall efficiency of proceedings which
may be presided over by a relatively inexperienced or uncertain ALL. 359
It may be that the requirement of maintaining its own ALJs would be burden-
some for any individual depository institution regulator, given the relatively small
number of formal enforcement proceedings that advance to the hearing stage. 360
Nevertheless, sporadic details of nonbanking agency ALJs hardly would seem to be
an adequate alternative.
In response to this problem, the ACUS adopted a recommendation that the
regulators consider developing a pooling arrangement for the employment of admin-
istrative law judges, to be available to each pool participant as necessary. 36' The
regulators essentially ignored the recommendation.3 62 FIRREA has provided clear
legal authority for an ALJ pooling arrangement, and, indeed, has made such an
arrangement mandatory. 363
One other pervasive problem in the practice of the agencies is evident from a
review of Illustration 2, and even a cursory reading of the text of the regulatory
provisions cited in the illustration. There is significant variation, in terms of relative
degrees of detail, and occasionally in terms of basic approach, among the rules of
practice and procedure respectively adopted by the regulators. As the ACUS Report
noted:
Given that each of the regulators is implementing essentially the same statutory authorities,
it is not readily understandable why the procedural regulations should vary to the extent that
they do from agency to agency. Admittedly, there are extensive similarities among these
357. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1989):
Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be
conducted in accordance with lid. §§] 556 and 557....
(Emphasis added.)
358. See ACUS Report, supra note 344, at 1337.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 1337-38 n.504.
361. 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1989).
362. In its revised rules, the FDIC provided specific procedures for the appointment of ALJs that made it clear that
it would continue the practice of detailing AI~s. 12 C.F.R. § 308.06(a),(b)(1) (1989). The FHLBB revised rules are
virtually identical in this regard. See id. § 509.3(a),(b)(1). However, the FHLBB did advert to the proposal favorably in
its discussion of the revised rules. See 54 Fed. Reg. 26,353 (1989). To the extent that it even alludes to the issue, the OCC
proposed revision is entirely ambiguous. See id. at 22,768 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 19. l(k)) (defining "presiding
officer" as "an administrative law judge... designated by the Comptroller... to conduct a hearing"). The Fed rules
are similarly ambiguous. See 12 C.F.R. § 263.6(a)(1) (1989) ("an administrative law judge.., lawfully appointed by
the Board"). In contrast, the NCUA regulations are forthright in describing the process of appointment of an AL. See
id. § 747.106(a) ("an Administrative Law Judge selected by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, Office of Personnel
Management and designated by the Board").
363. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 916(1).
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regulations, but the significant differences in degree of detail. . . do[] not seem justifiable.
Further, all of these regulations are weak on such details as rules of discovery and
evidence. 364
The ACUS accepted this position, and adopted a recommendation that
The [five] agencies should develop, so far as feasible, a uniform set of rules of practice
and procedure for formal adjudications, including more explicit provisions covering pre-
hearing practice and discovery rules and the receipt of evidence. 365
The ACUS took account of the fact that absolute uniformity was probably
neither achievable nor desirable. Nevertheless, the ACUS argued, "the five agencies
jointly should be able to develop substantially similar rules of procedure and practice
for formal enforcement proceedings. "366 From observable actions on the part of
agencies since the adoption of the ACUS recommendation, however, it would appear
that the agencies have been unable to do so.
As of the enactment of FIRREA, neither the Fed nor the NCUA had publicly
initiated any substantial review of their respective rules of practice and procedure.
The FDIC and the FHLBB had by then completed revisions of their rules, and the
OCC had begun such a process, but there still appeared to be nothing like a movement
towards uniformity-"substantial" or otherwise-even among these three agencies.
By far the most responsive effort has been that of the FDIC, and its revised rules
might well serve as a target for the substantial convergence of the respective rules of
the other regulators. The FDIC revision manifests a substantial response to ACUS
concerns over the need for detail in rules governing prehearing practice. This re-
sponse is evident in the relatively detailed treatment of such matters as the appoint-
ment and powers of ALJs,367 maintenance of the record, 368 filing and service of
papers, 369 time limits, 370 witness fees and expenses, 371 settlement offers,372 amend-
ment of pleadings and intervention, 373 consolidation and severance of actions, 374 and
motion practice. 375
While the FDIC revision does represent a marked improvement over its previous
rules as to discovery, both in terms of the level of detail and overall informativeness
of the provisions, 376 the general limitation of discovery to documentary discovery is
virtually no advance over previous provisions. 377 As to rules of evidence, the FDIC
revision has also provided relatively more detailed guidance. 378 In particular, it
364. ACUS Report, supra note 344, at 1336.
365. 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
366. 52 Fed. Reg. 49,151 (1987).
367. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 308.06-308.07 (1987).
368. See id. § 308.11.
369. See id. §§ 308.12-308.13.
370. See id. §§ 308.14-308.15.
371. See id. § 308.16.
372. See id. § 308.17.
373. See id. §§ 308.22-308.23.
374. See id. § 308.24.
375. See id. § 308.30.
376. See id. §§ 308.25-308.27.
377. Compare id. § 308.29(a) with 12 C.F.R. § 308.08(a)(2) (1988).
378. See 12 C.F.R. § 308.38 (1989).
1989] ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL BANKING REGULATIONS
adopts suggestions made by this author and by the ACUS 379 for inclusion of specific
reference in the rules to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing exclu-
sion of evidence when the probative value is outweighed by such factors as its
potential for undue consumption of time. 380
The FHLBB revisions represented a similar, if even less complete, movement in
the direction suggested by the ACUS recommendation. Its treatment of rules of
evidence remains limited, however, 38' and little if any advance has been made with
respect to discovery practice. 382 Furthermore, while it may be premature to judge the
OCC position on the basis of its notice of proposed rulemaking, it must be said that
the peculiar stylistic fragmentation of the generally applicable procedural provisions
into a multitude of subparts seems only to mask the fact that little advance over the
current OCC rules would result from the adoption of the OCC proposal. In any event,
the OCC proposed revision would, if anything, result in even less uniformity in the
rules of practice and procedure among the five regulators.
FIRREA has now imposed a statutory mandate on the regulators to "develop a
set of uniform rules and procedures for administrative hearings, including provisions
for summary judgment rulings where there are no disputes as to material facts of the
case. "383 As matters now stand, the regulators are further removed from even the
substantial uniformity advocated by the ACUS than they were when the ACUS
recommendation was made in December 1987. A uniform set of rules must now be
adopted within twenty-four months of August 9, 1989, the date of FIRREA
enactment.38 4 Since it took the FDIC over nine months to move from its proposed
revision to its final adoption, and the FHLBB took over eight months, the regulators
would be well advised to turn their full attention immediately to FIRREA's mandate
in this regard. 385 Much time and effort would be saved if the regulators took the
FDIC's revision as a commendable, if not wholly complete, starting point for their
movement towards uniform rules.
379. See, e.g., I C.F.R. § 305.86-2 (1989).
380. 12 C.F.R. § 308.38(a) (1989).
381. See id. § 509.24. See also 54 Fed. Reg. 26,351 (1989) (FHLBB discussion; rejecting suggestions for expanded
provisions with respect to rules of evidence).
382. See 12 C.F.R. § 509.21-509.23 (1989). See also 54 Fed. Reg. 26,351 (1989) (FHLBB discussion; endorsing
limited use of prehearing discovery).
383. FIRREA, supra note 1, § 916(2).
384. See id.
385. The NCUA has already promulgated regulatory amendments in response to specific changes in enforcement-
related statutory provisions made by FIRREA. See 54 Fed. Reg. 43,280 (1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 747). However,
these amendments do not further the FIRREA objective of uniform formal enforcement procedures. Indeed, the immediate
effect of these amendments is to increase the lack of uniformity among the corresponding regulations of the five agencies.
Cf. Illustration 2, note b, supra.
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